The presence of militias in eastern Libya is not only due to the tribal structure of that area; rather because of the presence of the Libyan special forces informally known as Al-Saiqa and some military brigades. Besides, air force engineers managed to repair a number of grounded fighter jets at Benina Airbase prior to confronting Ansar Al-Sharia militias, the armored battalions, and 17 February battalion, in addition to Rafallah al-Sahati brigade. Most of these militias are essentially Islamist or supportive of Misrata militias.

The presence of militias in eastern Libya is not only due to the tribal structure of that area; rather because of the presence of the Libyan special forces informally known as Al-Saiqa and some military brigades. Besides, air force engineers managed to repair a number of grounded fighter jets at Benina Airbase prior to confronting Ansar Al-Sharia militias, the armored battalions, and 17 February battalion, in addition to Rafallah al-Sahati brigade. Most of these militias are essentially Islamist or supportive of Misrata militias.

In the west, large numbers of militias are thriving in the absence of any military establishment, and the reason behind the spread of these militias is poor tribal structure, especially in the cities.

In the Bedouin belt in the west, the militias cluster into tribal groups like Zantan and Mashashiya. In the south, tribes mix with ethnicities. There are militias belonging to Tebu and Tuareq while others are affiliated to Awlad Suleiman tribe, qadhadhfa and Zuwaiya.

East of Libya, several tribes swore allegiance to Haftar except for al-Maghariba in Ajdabiya, the oil producer crescent and al-Awagir, which chose to support their candidate for the post of defense minister Al-Mahdi Al-Barghathi (The Editor: Included in the National Unity government composition and whose presence is considered important for disrupting the passage of the government due to being objected to by Haftar’s loyalists). In addition, Darsa tribe support Mohammed Hijazi (former Spokesperson of Operation Dignity forces) following his dispute with Haftar.

In the east too, the victims of assassinations, abduction, torture and detention will reconsider their allegiance to Haftar. Derna, on the other hand refuses to support him following the repeated air raids targeting their city by his jet fighters. The Benghazi inhabitants for their part also refuse to support Haftar and most of them belong to towns and tribes in western Libya.

Following ISISs expansion and its control of towns located east of Misrata, Haftar and Misrata’s forces competed over confronting ISIS, considering that such confrontation would bring international confrontation for both militias. For Haftar’s militia, it would also lead to lifting the much needed arms embargo and would improve the situation of Misrata’s forces, which earlier expanded beyond its boundaries and have now grown thin and are limited to defending the city.

Following ISIS’s control of Abu Grain, east of Misrata, it cut the brigades’ supply route in the south. Should it control al-Sadada gate, southeast of the city, ISIS would be able to reach Bani Waleed district in which it has many supporters, especially at Nesma district, which causes Misrata’s southeastern borders to be left unprotected.

Haftar avoids accessing Sirt through the coastal road, knowing that his rival Ibrahim Jadhran controls the oil producer crescent, i.e. the area extending from Adjabia, west of Benghazi to Ben Jawad, east of Sirt along the coastal road. He, therefore, sent his forces to Mirada and Zillah (southeast of Sirt) to flush out the forces led by Ziad Balaam who belongs to the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries. Those forces did not advance towards Sirt and only controlled the oil fields at Jalu, Awjla and Zillah.

While Jadhran controls the oil ports, Haftar controls the oilfields and his forces would stop oil exports. They earlier prevented the export of 650,000 barrels from Al-Hariqa port (the Indian oil tanker which was returned to Tripoli under a UN resolution). This situation will further aggravate the financial problems faced by the National Unity government.

Presuming that Haftar is serious about liberating Sirte even though he has not completed the liberation of Benghazi, he still has to face Ibrahim Jadhran, given that the coastal supply route is shorter than the desert road. Should this confrontation happen at the oil producer crescent, Libya would lose all of its oil investments.

On the other hand, the Misrata brigades do not appear to be intent on liberating Sirte and even if they succeeded to force ISIS out of the security zones it had controlled earlier, these brigades would stop at Abu Grain and would not advance further towards Sirte not only because it was Misrata that handed over Sirte to ISIS but also because it wants to strain Haftar’s forces in Sirte. It should be noted that Haftar’s forces took more than a year in their fighting in Benghazi and they are likely to last much longer in Sirte especially since ‘Al-Saiqa’ and the urban youth who supported them against the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries will not be with them in Sirte.

On the other hand, if Haftar defeated Ibrahim Jadhran’s forces and ISIS, a full out civil war would be inevitable between Haftar and Misrata on one hand and Misrata and its enemies in the western region on the other.

It is no secret that Haftar relies upon the remnants of the enhanced Brigade 32, previously led by Khamis Gaddafi, in addition to forces from the Sudanese Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and Tebu tribe militias from Chad and Libya which have a long experience in desert fighting. Misrata brigades feel that they are targeted by Haftar’s moves in the long run and that Gaddafi’s loyalists aim to take punitive action against that rebellious city.

Besides, the Benghazi residents hold Misrata responsible for all the destruction and atrocities committed against their city. The Tebu tribe seeks to take revenge on the third Misrata-allied force that fought its members in the south. It seems that the western circles are in favor of this scenario, this being the only affordable option to destroy the weapons in the hands of the militias, tribes, and Haftar. The ultimate result, however, will be Libya’s destruction.