When uprisings erupted in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya  – collectively known as the Arab Spring – few people would have predicted such violent consequences. The stance adopted by different national armies has been significant.

In Tunisia, the country that lived under a secular regime since its independence, the army  positively and professionally stood alongside the demonstrators, avoiding political polarisation.

When uprisings erupted in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya  – collectively known as the Arab Spring – few people would have predicted such violent consequences. The stance adopted by different national armies has been significant.

In Tunisia, the country that lived under a secular regime since its independence, the army  positively and professionally stood alongside the demonstrators, avoiding political polarisation.

In Egypt, on the other hand, the army has not protected demonstrators from assaults by civilian militias and thugs. The Egyptian army made its view public only when it sensed the oncoming inevitable fall of the former regime, pressuring Hosni Mubarak to step down. It adopted the view that it is better to sacrifice the president than the whole regime.

This was not at all surprising for an army that has been confiscating power since 1952. Even if we separate the presidential office, headed by a former military officer, and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces that took power after the toppling of Mubarak, the economic and strategic accumulated interests mean the Egyptian military has much to lose from the potential outcome of current events. The Camp David agreement and U.S. military aid to the Egyptian army have transformed the military into a separate entity, a state within a state. A force forced to interfere in all affairs affecting their interests whether under the leadership of Mohammed Tantawi or the current commander-in-chief, General Abdul Fattah al-Sisi.

In Libya, the situation was different.  The country lacked any professional army –  former President Gaddafi deliberately destroyed it in Chad after numerous coup attempts. When rebel battalions were formed during and after the fall of Gaddafi, all political currents in the country tried to control these armed groups, which resulted in a state of balanced terror, especially in Tripoli.

In the east of Libya, Islamic groups succeeded in gaining influence and suppressing the civil movements that ignited the revolution. Yet despite the failure of the Muslim Brotherhood in local elections, who lost out to the national forces coalition, the organisation’s military connections and alliances with independent members within the National Transitional Council (NTC) ensured the Brotherhood retained influence.

In Egypt, the Brotherhood mishandled its first opportunity to rule the country since 1928. Instead of coordinating with opposition forces, they worked to exclude everyone and monopolize power. They were oblivious of the omnipotence and complex interests of the armed forces. They ignored the security forces, who in turn ignored Morsi’s orders, and disregarded the bureaucracy of the judiciary system. They eliminated all state authorities and ended up with a symbolic power represented by an elected president and an ineffective government.

The Brotherhood did not modernise the vision of their founder Hassan al-Banna. Their organization’s strategies turned into a Masonic lodge instead of a political organization replete with a vision and political program.

Now, the Muslim Brotherhood would do better to abandon the results of the last presidential elections and put forward another candidate for the next round at the ballot box.

And finally a warning to the Egyptian military: the armed forces will never be able to eliminate the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic factions.