You never know the moment when the entire state may turn into a mafia. In Italy – the original habitat of the mafia, which changed from resistance of occupation to a gang – you may visualize the time when the mafia managed in the 1990s to control Italy’s key apparatuses and ruling figures.

You never know the moment when the entire state may turn into a mafia. In Italy – the original habitat of the mafia, which changed from resistance of occupation to a gang – you may visualize the time when the mafia managed in the 1990s to control Italy’s key apparatuses and ruling figures.

In Egypt, where the population almost regards the state as its idol, the greatest miracle, and a virtual pyramid which provides people with protection and social cover, the mafia transformation does not occur outside the pyramid or along the Italian model, where bunches of mafia organs occupy state apparatuses, piece by piece. In Egypt, transformation is a gradual process, and its hallmark is the security service, where the entire state becomes a mere tool designed to protect the interests of a small group whose only members know the trend of such interests.

Ultimately, the security apparatus changes into a tool, geared up to serve the interests of specific groups, while protection is provided through unofficial security echelons commonly referred to by the media as gangs and their leaders are known as thugs. These thugs are in fact, part of the game and perform what the security apparatus fail to do. They are the secret players or the unobserved parties of the security apparatus responsible for protecting the mafia, which will very soon become the state itself.

The mafia and past presidents

The mafia was never on the margins of the rule of the last general, Mubarak. It was the regime’s way of governance through which the ruler used his administrative bureaucratic body to control every inch of the country. But at the same time, he was incapable of achieving the project of a “modern state” unrealized under Muhammad Ali or even after 1952. The cherished goal of the ‘modern state’ remained captive of the regime elites’ dreams and individual adventures on a land whose pyramid (the state) was thirsty for a new structure, expressed the in 1919 Revolution, which declared that the Egyptians were able to govern themselves.

The “state project” survived due to Abdul Nasser’s ideological charges, followed by Sadat’s promised democratic transformation in accordance with the American way. However, the “coterie rule” remained the distinctive approach used by Western studies to describe a post-revolution governance system. Gamal Abdel Nasser was in favor of a ‘trusted people’ concept, a version Nasser learned from Muhammad Ali, who chose close relatives and assigned them land and fiefdoms. They formed a closely related category which protected him and was protected by him.

Abdul Nasser’s coterie consisted of revolutionaries, including families that ruled the country before the revolution.  Abdul Nasser decided to end royal family rule, which he said were ’16 families only’. His goal was to end their monopoly of power and wealth. He formed a family comprising revolutionary generals who soon controlled the country, guided by the Big Father’s leadership. That coterie believed, or claimed to believe, in the revolution’s principles, besides its members’ interests.

Things somewhat changed with the rise to power of Anwar Sadat who chose a new coterie mainly consisting of old rich families – such as the Osmans, the Sayed Mareis, the Abdulghaffars, etc. – which worked under the cover of the revolution and its subsidiary lines. Sadat established close affinities with those families, making them more influential and providing the president with power and security.

Some families maintained their influence over the years, and benefited from the principle of nurturing the secret channels between money and politics. An example of such families is the Ghalis whose one member believed that ministers should graduate from specific colleges. Others families have multi affiliations—the Mohieddins, who comprised socialists and liberals from the government and opposition, and the Abazas who are equally divided into ‘Wafd’ Party affiliates and others within the government).

Mubarak’s coterie, however, was distinctive and its most important feature was that it had no big project; its sole project was to promote its members’ interests. That nearly marked the moment when Nakhnokh became the president.

He belonged to an era when the country was divided into republics or fiefdoms with each republic being managed by a trusted bigwig who was provided with power, wealth and arms to control his republic and ensure its loyalty to the president.

If Mubarak, his family, or the mafia sponsored by him were to return, Nakhnokh would certainly be the minister of interior or investment.

The mafia prince

Nakhnokh was a prince, as the press called him, when he was arrested; however, he was more than a mere thug. He did not differentiate between mafia and state; to him, both represented a single entity that maintained stability in the country and allowed him to amass more money and build greater luxurious palaces.

He was an “organic intellectual” in some kind of a twisted meaning. He was an advocate of the country’s interests, as seen by the president – he meant President Hosni Mubarak of course. He was telling the truth when he said he “served the country and protected the interests of high ranking officials who used to stage-manage the state as they pleased.”

Nakhnokh was the authorities’ arm, and might have become its brain if the situation had turned upside down and the man in the center of the republic’s fiefdoms had decided to reward his honest men or change their titles. Then, Nakhnokh would not be the prince of thugs; but “a popular hero” who protected the country from “infiltrating elements” and “agents,” starting with controlling the elections and ending with controlling the independence of the republic’s fiefdom against the impending danger.

This has made Nakhnokh believe he should avenge the Muslim Brotherhood, and that his arrest is a Brotherhood conspiracy, while he in fact was carrying out his mission of preserving the pillars of the state pending the return of its masters.

Nakhnokh’s consciousness is neither transient nor mythical. It is the secret consciousness under which Egypt was ruled for many years, where trusted people like Nakhnokh were chosen for local control, away from regulations, problems of the rights, and requirements of the modern state.

Nakhnokh’s modernity is manifested in pleasures of ‘wine and drugs’, making friendship with stars and his capacity to resolve any problem and use bureaucratic authorities which enforce their rules among citizens.  But when it comes to the president, they turn into servants and guards. Nakhnokh stood in the court, proud and smiling; he was a warrior taking a short break; he threatened and recounted the details of his control over his republic. He threatened presenting pictorial confessions that may implicate whoever stood in his way, including Brotherhood leaderships.

Nakhnokh is not an accused, but a resistor of an authority occupying the seats under which he used to operate and endeavor to preserve its stability. He is the product of a regime, which built a set of networks akin to secret gangs strongly existing in parallel to the authority of the state.

Protective gangs

There are financial, familial, and perhaps sectarian and political powers trying to resolve small wars standing in the way of whoever threatens their interests, who recruit well-trained professional gangs.

The feeling of the existence of these gangs was sometimes more dangerous than their actual existence because they might at a given moment be a crucial element in resolving a political or judicial battle where law became ineffective and the stronger side or whoever could suggest that he was stronger would prevail.

When Mubarak was toppled and his party was disintegrated, that parallel authority was not defeated; rather, it continued and posed as the regime’s last protector.

Nakhnokh is distinctive among characters that have emerged and revealed the extensive reliance on that secret, public power. It is an undeclared authorization to control a certain area. The authorized individual may be an ordinary person, but he will all of a sudden morph into a ‘mafia leader’ who controls and manages other gangs and plays parts in dominating his area. That part is reportedly assigned by the security services which in turn deny it, but people often do not believe them.

Barbari has not measured up to the level of Ezzat Hanafi or Nofal Saad, but he acted like them, or was on his way to impose his control over the region. This can only occur as a reward, but for what? Is it for securing his region, or for tipping detectives about weapons and drugs? The most serious roles are usually concerned with disrupting the elections, stealing ballot boxes, intimidating opponents, and playing a secret role in deciding elections results.

These networks exist, intermittently operated during the first transitional stage and were the effective resistance stronghold in the face of the revolution. The size and effective level of such networks are not accurately known but they are still effective and can be activated by any authority because they simply work under the principle of loyalty to whoever comes to power.

Boasting his shrewdness and ability to control thousands of men, Nakhnokh succeeded in deciding electoral battles, from presidency to parliament. Among his men is a president who supports, channels and invests the capacities of the people of his republic in favor of what he believes serves the interest of the country.

He is the strong arm that quickly moves unnoticed away from the complexities of laws to resolve disputes and assist those capable of footing the bill. These gangs’ leaders have turned into power partners, and its organic intellectuals. Nakhnokh is by no means the only eloquent player who holds awareness or accepts being the command enforcer. Ezzat Hanafi – another republic president— in Dakahlia in Upper Egypt – was in a sense a philosopher, and a poet whose verse reeks of authority and power ideology.

These are neither traditional thugs nor criminals; they are rather partners in an authority whose company is now under a state of restructuring or distribution of interest quotas.

This is the secret of Nakhnokh’s defiant language. He defends his republic and its borders against the Brotherhood conspiracy. This is also the secret of the Brotherhood’s preoccupation with Nakhnokh. He is the “unconscious” mind of their state, which appears to be a marriage between a defeated mafia and another mafia that has been decadently brought up in good governance schools. The defeated mafia went to gather its arms – the secret gangsters – to confront Brotherhood graduates who are desirous to be part of the ruling game. Both are miserable, but they have run a joint show through which they try to get people back into the arms of old fear and form a new mafia whose first condition is to get rid of the new people, who prefer not to rest to the sound of the mafia music.