This follows an earlier commentary, which charted how Libya was the first colony to gain independence by a UN resolution after World War II and the first to gain a special international representative to support it

This follows an earlier commentary, which charted how Libya was the first colony to gain independence by a UN resolution after World War II and the first to gain a special international representative to support it on its road to self-determination.

The UN special representative Mr. Adriaan Pelt (Dutch) chaired a UN mission to oversee the selection of 60 Libyans to form a constitutional body representing the three regions of the country. It was his job to draft a national constitution, with the help of constitutional experts provided by the UN mission. The task was completed and approved by the 60-strong Constitutional Body months before Libyan independence on December 24, 1951.

In March 2011, almost 60 years after Libyan independence, the United Nations issued Resolution 1973, allowing international military intervention to protect its civilians. Most Libyans viewed the resolution as a historic milestone and an opportunity to achieve their second independence, again wresting power from a fascist regime.

A UN special representative was appointed, enabling then to form the first independent state, while another chaired technical mission to support nation building. Because twenty-first century Libya is far removed from mid-twentieth century Libya, three representatives took the helm within four years: the Lebanese Tarek Mitri, the Spaniard Bernardino Leon and the German Martin Kobler.

But what divided the Libya of then and the contemporary nation? First, Libyans today are no longer the Bedouins of the World War II. When it gained independence, Libya was the world’s poorest country, with empty national coffers and a one-million strong population, of whom 95 percent were illiterate. Meanwhile, fifteen percent of the population were blind due to trachoma disease and there were few university graduates as the Italian occupiers would not allow Libyans to learn beyond primary school.

This small educated elite, including university and middle school graduates and tribal elders, ensured a smooth political transition process, adopting a democratic secular constitution with a parliamentary monarchy rule, an unprecedented development in the Arab region.

Libya was not immune to the regional wave of military coups in the 1960s, with its own coup enacted by a lieutenant who immediately ditched the constitution and ousted the monarchy. He dubbed Libyan independence 1951 as a mistake, and called the independent state’s leaders reactionary traitors.

About 42 years later, Tunisia’s Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire as a protest against humiliation and (economic marginalisation). However, the Libyans were not directly affected by the Tunisians. The revolution reached their Egyptian neighbours, to the east, but quickly rebound onto them from both sides.

Unlike Ben Ali and Mubarak, Gaddafi followed the maxim: “I will rule you or kill you.” Six decades after Libya’s liberation from the foreign colonizer, the UN Security Council once more embraced Libyans’ call for liberation. Thanks to the NATO-led international air military intervention, rebels liberated the capital and arrested and killed Gaddafi within a few months.

In 2011, most Libyans took to the streets with a common goal of removing the tyrant and his regime. However, after the demise of his regime, Libyans experience differed from the post-independence phase.

Within a few short months of the revolution, Libyans found themselves facing thousands of Gadaffi-like warlords and politicians from across the ideological spectrum as well as a range of terrorist groups and banditry. What would a UN representative do in such a situation?

Tarek Mitri dealt with the Libyan issue as if in a tourist mission. He even tried to apply the Lebanese approach of sectarian quotas, giving the influence of the warlords competing over the capital, represented by the National Forces Alliance militias on the one hand and the Political Islamist Alliance militias on the other.

In the end, Mitri’s papers were burned and he was deposed. His successor, Bernardino León was a smart mediator. Although he was citicised for his focus on improving his own CV, he succeeded in dealing with the Libyan issue comprehensively: He communicated with the political parties represented by the two disputing institutions: General National Congress and the House of Representatives. He also mediated with mayors, political forces, both partisan and independent, and influential community players, including civil society organizations and tribal elders.

Martin Kobler continued the political process in Libya when Bernardino Leon left. “León is León, and Kobler is Kobler,” he says, underlining their difference in style and approach. After assuming his duties, his diplomatic activity appeared more intelligent, visible and credible, commentators said.

He increasingly attained results, especially after the Rome Conference on December 13, 2015, which was attended by foreign ministers of the five permanent UNSC members, as well as representatives of foreign ministers of Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Turkey and EU representatives. They clearly and decisively called for a consensus government that the international community can deal with. After four days, in the Moroccan city of Skhirat, the majority of members of the two legislatures (House of Representatives in the east and National Congress in the west) and partisan and independent political figures signed an agreement to resolve the Libyan crisis under the auspices of the United Nations. The agreement aimed at creating a consensus government to lead the country’s transition towards drafting the constitution, which would be put to referendum. In addition, it aimed to steer towards legislative, presidential and municipal elections.

In the process, a new alliance emerged, reflecting those who lost their political influence in the agreement, mainly the heads of the two adversary legislative bodies. They agreed to reject the Skhirat agreement and considered the proposed government as international protectorate, as opposed to the product of a Libyan-Libyan dialogue. But their objection to the political agreement  made under the auspices of the major powers had limited impact.

Nouri Abusahmain, president of GNC – Tripoli commanded a very small minority of support. As well as a lack of political weight, he had weak militias, after major militias of Misrata joined the supporters of the national consensus project.

His ally, Oqaila Saleh, President of the House of Representatives – Tobruk as well as most members and the Barqa tribe leaders supported the Skhirat agreement, which was adopted by the Security Council in Resolution 2015 issued on December 23, 2015.

The question remains: Will the United Nations succeed in playing a paternalistic role to the Libyan people in the context of an inclusive political project to build a stable democracy? Will it be able to oversee national support for the Skhirat agreement?

Challenges loom for the international organisation, not least because of current political divisions, regional strife and rampant terrorism, sparking widespread pessimism among Libyans about its chances of success.