Koert Debeuf lives in Cairo, where he represents Alliance for Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) in the parliament of the European Union. He is the former advisor of Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt, an author and founder of the think tank Prometheus. Reporting from post-revolutionary Egypt, his blog examines events in the Arab world. In part one of this exclusive interview, Debeuf paints National Forces Alliance leader Mahmoud Jibril as a pivotal figure in convincing western leaders to implement a no-fly-zone over Libya in 2011.
Koert Debeuf lives in Cairo, where he represents Alliance for Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) in the parliament of the European Union. He is the former advisor of Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt, an author and founder of the think tank Prometheus. Reporting from post-revolutionary Egypt, his blog examines events in the Arab world. In part one of this exclusive interview, Debeuf paints National Forces Alliance leader Mahmoud Jibril as a pivotal figure in convincing western leaders to implement a no-fly-zone over Libya in 2011.
Mr. Debeuf, you wrote the “untold story” of the no-fly-zone in Libya, why do you say there is a “hidden” story?
The most told version of what happened has been loudly spread by Bernard Henri-Lévy, how he went to Libya, came back to Paris and convinced Sarkozy to plea for a no-fly-zone. It was also BHL who convinced Mahmoud Jibril to come to Paris and it was he who pushed the president to recognize the National Transition Council. A very short version of the heroic story of Henri-Lévy is most probably true indeed.
If Sarkozy was the first one to call for a no-fly-zone in Libya, just one week after the revolution started on February 17, 2011, I do not doubt BHL did play his role. In the rest of this history the starring role was not played by BHL, but by Mahmoud Jibril.
How was that?
In the first week of March a Libyan opposition member in Brussels called Louis Michel (the former Foreign Minister of Belgium and now Member of European Parliament) to ask if he could see some members of the National Transition Council. The first thing Michel did was call Guy Verhofstadt, former Prime Minister of Belgium and now president of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats in the European Parliament (ALDE). They both agreed they should invite these Libyan to the ALDE Group in the European Parliament in Strasbourg.
The meeting of the ALDE group was on March 8, but we could only start with the procedure for the visa on Saturday the 5th. I called the Chief of Staff of the Foreign Minister of Belgium. Apart from the fact that he was not very cooperative (who of these Libyan rebels are?), he explained to me that an urgency visa procedure exists, but that this only counted for the country that issues it and not for the entire Schengen zone.
So, we had to call the French government. My colleague got permission and a security clearance from the French Minister of Interior. As a former advisor of President Sarkozy, he of course warned the President that two members of the NTC would be in France: Dr. Mahmoud Jibril and Dr. Ali Al-Issawi.
Did you know them before?
The only thing we knew about both gentlemen was that Al-Issawi was the Libyan ambassador in India and that he defected to the opposition in February as a reaction to the violent response of Muammar Gaddafi. Of Mahmoud Jibril we knew close to nothing.
The contact person we had to call for more practical arrangements was a lawyer, living in Geneva. His name was Ali Zeidan. I only realized a few weeks ago that this was actually the same person as the current Libyan Prime Minister.
What happened at the meeting of the ALDE group on March 8?
At the meeting (which was open to other parties as well), Mahmoud Jibril surprised everyone. This unknown man was so short and precise in his description of the situation of the Libyan revolution and in his demands to the European Union, that for the audience it was almost impossible not to be convinced. Jibril spoke with authority. Most of all, he made clear to everyone that there would be a serious alternative if Gaddafi fell.
Jibril asked three things of the international community:
1. The recognition of the National Interim Council as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people;
2. Guarantee the supply of humanitarian assistance to the Libyan people, particularly where there was a shortage of food and medicine and a lack of secure telephone lines;
3. Enforcement of a no-fly-zone (but no military intervention) to prevent further killing.
Guy Verhofstadt asked me to write these demands into a press release, with the plea to the international community to support each one of these demands.
Did the EU support those requests and what was the reaction from the EU?
We tried to convince EU High Representative Catherine Ashton to meet with Jibril. She hesitated. A few days earlier she had received a common letter from all European ambassadors in Tripoli in which they stated it would be best for the EU not to take sides in the conflict. After all, what would the EU do if Gaddafi won? But a few hours later her spokesperson told me at the coffee bar that she would meet him, but that it would be a secret meeting. The meeting apparently went well as he called me to say it was ok for the press to know about it.
During the debate in the plenary of the European Parliament the next day Ashton refused to promise anything about the possible recognition of the NTC, even though most speakers did ask for it. I even had to go to her with a compromise proposal in which she would promise to put it on the table of the European Council. But as Ashton never moves without having consulted with the other Ministers of Foreign Affairs, she even refused to say that.
When did the French government take action?
President Sarkozy on the contrary did not hesitate. Originally, the plan of the Libyan delegation was to go to Geneva after the plenary debate in Strasbourg. Zeidan knew his way there and would organize some interesting meetings. But the plans changed as the Elysée called them: the President of France wanted to meet them.
Sarkozy knew he didn’t make a very good impression by not supporting the revolution in Tunisia. Next to that, he was not doing well in the opinion polls for the presidential elections.
As he knew from his Interior Minister that the Libyan opposition was in the country and probably saw the ALDE press release, he saw his chance. So, on March 10 that’s where they went.
How did you hear about President Sarkozy recognizing the National Transition Council?
I was driving in my car back home when I heard on the news that Sarkozy recognized the National Transition Council and of course supported the other two demands of Jibril, as he had already called for a no-fly-zone. Nobody in the French government was informed, not even not his Foreign Minister Alain Juppé. Juppé and his German colleague, Guido Westerwelle just closed their bilateral meeting and were walking towards the press point. A few meters before the press point one of the advisors of Juppé gave him a small piece of paper. To his surprise he read the message that his president just recognized the NTC. Although not known for hesitating, Sarkozy must have been very convinced of what he heard and saw of Jibril.
Here the Libyan opposition started its moves to convince the Security Council, what do you know about that?
Although winning the support of France was very important, it would not have been enough to convince the UN Security Council to install a no-fly-zone over Libya. It, of course, helped a lot that the Arab League asked for a no-fly-zone on March 12, in a unique moment of decisiveness and consensus. But to push it through it needed the support of the United States.
That was a problem. The US was very much surprised by the demand of the Arab League, but still had no appetite at all to go into another Arab war. Colum Lynch (Turtlebay, October 23, 2012) wrote that the US Ambassador to the UN snapped at her French colleague who asked for support: “You are not going to drag us into your shitty war.”
When did Americans change their attitude?
Two days before the vote on Resolution 1973 on March 17, 2011, Susanne Rice changed positions and started very actively to convince the other countries to endorse the resolution. On March 15 Rice said: “We are discussing very seriously and leading efforts in the Council around a range of actions that we believe could be effective in protecting civilians — those include discussion of a No-Fly Zone. But the U.S. view is that we need to be prepared to contemplate steps that include, but perhaps go beyond, a no fly zone.
At this point, as the situation on the ground evolved, and as a no-fly-zone has inherent limitations in terms of protection of civilians at immediate risk.”
Tell us about the meeting between Jibril and Clinton?
On March 15, Clinton went to Cairo where she met with Egyptian Foreign Minister El-Arabi and with Amr Moussa, Secretary-General of the Arab League, who explained to her why the Arab states were convinced about an intervention in Libya. It’s no secret that Gaddafi was not especially liked by the other Arab leaders.
However, few people know about the meeting Clinton had the day before, on March 14, in Paris. She had to be there that day for the G8. It was most probably Sarkozy who convinced her to meet with Mahmoud Jibril. After his meeting with the French President, Jibril, Al-Issawi and Zeidan took the train to Brussels. He quickly had to come back to Paris for probably the most important mission of his life: convincing the United States to support the UN resolution that would allow the installation of a no-fly-zone in Libya.
Clinton and Jibril met for 45 minutes. After the meeting however, no declaration was given and no information was leaked, which is usually an indication that something important happened.
The rest of the story is well known. The Security Council adopted Resolution 1973, after intensive lobbying by France, the UK and the US. At the beginning of the meeting with those countries that agreed to participate to the no-fly-zone, France immediately sent fighter jets to Benghazi.
Most Libyans believe that France was the first country that supported the Libyan revolution while you’re saying something different in your article. Can you give more details?
France was the first country to ask for a no-fly-zone and thus the first country to support the Libyan revolution. I am not doubting this. What I am saying is that the real breakthrough came when Jibril, Zeidan and Al-Issawi came to Europe as the representatives of the organized opposition, the NTC. They came with very precise demands: a no-fly-zone, recognition of the NTC as the sole representatives of the Libyan people and aid for the Libyan people. They came by invitation of the ALDE group to the European Parliament. The French government, however, was again the first government to recognize the NTC.
