Zeinab Abul-Magd, Middle Eastern History Professor at the American Oberlin College opposes the name ‘Second Republic’ given to Egypt’s present circumstances, as a totalitarian regime still persists, especially with regard to the status of the military. Since May 2011, Abul-Magd has been conducting research on the Egyptian army’s economic empire. She published her first article on this subject under a pseudonym, while other essays were later published under her real name.

Zeinab Abul-Magd, Middle Eastern History Professor at the American Oberlin College opposes the name ‘Second Republic’ given to Egypt’s present circumstances, as a totalitarian regime still persists, especially with regard to the status of the military. Since May 2011, Abul-Magd has been conducting research on the Egyptian army’s economic empire. She published her first article on this subject under a pseudonym, while other essays were later published under her real name. She is currently awaiting the publication of her latest book about the history of subaltern revolutions in Southern Egypt over five centuries.

Professor Abul-Magd, how do you view the status of the military under the Second Republic?

To begin with, there is no second republic. We still live under the same authoritarian regime, supported by Mubarak, which is based on a one-party monopoly of power, a neo-liberal economy, repressive practices carried out by the police against opponents, and restrictions imposed on the media and civil society organizations.

Mubarak regime’s main loyalists still exist and operate along the same policy. Therefore, we cannot claim that there is a Second Republic, but we may say the Muslim Brotherhood has inherited Mubarak’s authoritarian regime.

The Second Republic will be born when the elements and mechanisms needed to change Egyptian society’s economic, political and social structure are made available. So, I can say the military enjoys the same position and plays the same roles it used to play under Mubarak, and has even grown more powerful and become a formidable obstacle of democratic change.

When do you think the military changed from a combatant institution to one with economic interests?

Throughout Mubarak’s era, the military’s main concern was to establish major economic projects. That change dates back to 1979 after the war ended and the Peace Accord with Israel was signed, when Sadat set up the Ministry of Defense National Service Projects Organization (NSPO), whose mission was to help the government establish infrastructural projects.

In the 1980s, Defense Minister Field Marshal Abu Ghazalah set the ground for the army’s engagement in entrepreneurial activities, primarily focused on building residential and commercial complexes for army officers. That policy later expanded considerably, especially in the 1990s, assuming greater proportions during the first decade of the new millennium.

Transition to a market economy officially started in 1992, following Egypt’s participation in the Gulf War, and the promises made to Mubarak to reschedule Egypt’s debts in return for implementing an economic reform program, including privatization of state-owned projects.

The army contributed to those efforts through establishing more projects, but with the rise of Gamal Mubarak and a number of closely related businessmen, the military started to feel that its business influence began to fade away, which prompted it to expand through NSPO, Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI), and the Ministry of Military Production (MoMP), in addition to producing public consumer commodities.

During the last decade of Mubarak’s reign, the army enjoyed tremendous economic concessions, and a distinctive standing within the regime. Retired army officers were assigned senior positions inside state bureaucracy, including governors, mayors, neighborhood chiefs, and heads of commissions and companies. Consequently, they acquired a large administrative authority, beside the achieved economic expansion.

In your opinion, did the rise of Gamal Mubarak and his business community in the last ten years lead to expanding or restricting the military?

Based on the research I have done, it may be said that the military began to flourish economically by the end of the 1990s. The first decade of the millennium experienced a huge economic boom, in which the army tried to control everything that could be reached, in competition with the emerging tycoons through Policy Committee.

After the revolution it was rumored that the military was against public sector privatization, and that during one of Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif’s meetings held to discuss the sale of a public sector company, Field Marshal Tantawi rejected the proposed sale.

This is propagandistic. Tantawi himself was a member of the privatization committee, and if that story was true, why were all those establishments and companies  sold? And, why did not Tantawi’s uprising happen in the beginning? Besides, the military was a competitor in sale operations, and when SEMAF – a railway company – was offered for privatization, AOI purchased it. How can the army be against privatization at a time when it was trying to take advantage of these deals and incorporate the sold companies to it?

One clear example is the sale of Nasr Car Factory, which was initiated in 2010 and then MoMP controlled it in recent weeks. At that time, Tantawi sent a letter to officials, expressing his desire to incorporate the company into NSPO. That transaction obviously means that the army was a competitor in an unfair competition, where the military laid hands on any public enterprise it wanted by virtue of its influence.

In addition, the army controlled a large number of foreign trade outlets, such as the Nile Shipping Transport Company – responsible for trade between Egypt and Sudan – over and above a huge number of loading and unloading companies through the assistance of top managers in charge of these companies in Alexandria and the Suez Canal.

Mubarak did allow that economic penetration because he wanted to please the army in order for him to implement the power succession project. This situation did not come to an end after the revolution, which is one of the most important signs of Mubarak’s sustained authoritarian regime. The army’s economic and political penetration has continued and it even increased in the beginning in a way that may be considered logical under the military council.

Some may naively believe that this situation ended after President Mohamed Morsi came to power, and the orchestrated removal of Tantawi. But, the Brotherhood too is trying to please the army.

Do not you think that the army’s control over the country’s bureaucratic apparatus through the presence of top military leaders at the head of companies, organizations and establishments was first started in 1952?

The era of the 1950s and 1960s was different; the army at that time did not acquire economic organizations, but ran the state and its institutions only as the ruler. Ownership of all existing projects then belonged to the socialist state as the sole investor, rather than to the private sector or any particular organization.

However, we can say that for the military, that era was a period geared for acquiring experience in the field of economic management, especially through interacting with the Soviet experience. Consequently, the military’s management experience is based on old Soviet knowledge characterized by repression against the business community towards building a socialist economy.

The military began the process of establishing its projects in the 1980s, assisted by the repressive Soviet experience. That tendency was facilitated by the fact that the army is based on the concept of obedience and discipline. A junior army officer employed in a factory producing refrigerators or television sets, for example, had to obey the factory manager, not only as a manager, but also as a military commander. Consequently, in case of challenging orders, violators would be court martialed and sent to a military prison.

What about the prototype picture always promoted by the media, and even through drama series, of a national Egyptian army that defends and protects the country?

This is simply a myth and a great misconception. Since the 1950s, the army has succeeded to cover itself with a set of myths and illusions, portraying itself as the shield and protector of the homeland, in addition to many other misleading qualities. That began with the tale of the ‘1952 revolution’ staged by the army. What happened in fact was not a revolution but a coup the Free Officers themselves did not describe in the beginning as a revolution, but as an ‘auspicious movement.’

Later, when Taha Hussein described the coup as a revolution, the propaganda and media agencies retold the coup story as a revolution. That historic era has undoubtedly been attractive, striking and full of strong national feelings. However, it is also full of myths and misconceptions. A large segment of the masses had faith in Abdul Nasser’s national project, but it was Abdul Nasser himself who caused them to feel the loss and frustration, and later the defeat against Israel and the loss of Sinai. That era was followed by another in which the slogan of ‘no voice is louder than the voice of battle’ prevailed, when the entire country’s human and material resources were mobilized to engage in a battle to restore what Abdul Nasser had lost.

In 1973 came the October war, which Sadat had lost, ending in semi-defeat, witnessed far and wide, while we lived and still live the big myth of the October 1973 victory. Sinai has been declared a demilitarized zone, with areas lying outside the Egyptian army’s control. Under the Peace Accord with Israel, the Egyptian army is only allowed to deploy a limited number of mechanized vehicles and a small number of soldiers, and it is prohibited from imposing full control over this region.

When the war ended, the military began creating a new myth that the army worked for developing the country, controlled prices through providing consumer goods at rates suiting the middle and lower classes, and saved state budget. Researches on these claims however reveal that they are mere illusions, and that the goal of the military’s economic projects is to increase its financial profits.

A clear example of this action is the Arish Cement Factory inaugurated by the army last April. Military commanders have repeatedly harped on the alleged goal of controlling cement prices in the markets, but surprisingly the prices of cement produced by this plant are not less than those quoted by other producers, and are sometimes higher even though the military does not pay taxes; customs duties; or water, electricity and energy consumption bills. Besides, the land of the factory has been contributed free of charge by the government, and the manpower are draftees who get low wages. There is no better word to describe this other than ‘exploitation.’

We are going through a delicate stage in which we have two bad options; the Brotherhood with all its successive daily failures and the bleak and pessimistic horizon towards which all are heading; and the alternative, the army, whose disadvantages and errors we all know. That explains why some are obliged to turn a blind eye to the mistakes made by the military lest the Brotherhood should unilaterally control power.

I do not want to remain silent about the unrestrained mistakes of the army. The continued existence of the military in this manner is one of the reasons that obstruct democratic transformation. In order to maintain its economic interests, the military has now become ready to sacrifice everything to ensure that its empire is not prejudiced even if it means that the Brotherhood, Salafists, or any other political factions come to power, since what it really matters to it is to keep its privileged situation of a constitutionally distinctive position, a secret budget, no civilian control, etc.

Do you believe there is a conflict between the military and the Brotherhood?

Yes, but the Brotherhood cannot now have control over the military. The former is therefore compelled to accept the latter’s terms, allowing it needed space and power. But, that does not mean there is no tension between the two sides.

What do you mean by the Brotherhood’s having control over the army?

I mean recruiting a large number of non-commissioned officers and soldiers in favor of the Brotherhood. By the way, the majority of military personnel and employees were recruited when the Brotherhood and Islamists in general dominated social life in Egypt. Considering the generally poor cultural level, they are automatically close to the Brotherhood’s discourse, and that worries senior army commanders.

Do you see any possibility of a coup by the military against the Brotherhood?

I do not think so because the army is now an economic institution that looks after its own interests. So long as those interests are achieved and ensured, why should it stage a coup that affects these interests?

How do you then explain the recent appeals by a number of politicians and public affairs individuals, demanding the return of the army?

Those appeals are made by two parties; the first is the old generation of intellectuals and politicians who lived under the military state in the 1950s and 1960s and also under Abdul Nasser, who still dream of the return of that state and look upon Abdul Nasser as the ideal leader. They still believe that the army is the only party capable of building the aspired modern state, since all modern national states which established huge modernizing projects throughout history had military leaders, like Napoleon, Kemal Ataturk, and Charles de Gaulle. The second party carries extreme hatred towards the Brotherhood, and is willing to accept any other alternative, no matter how bad, to get rid of Islamists’ rule in general.