British political scientist Timothy Mitchell, head of Middle Eastern Studies at Columbia University in New York, recently visited Cairo and delivered a few lectures at the American University based on his new book ‘Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil.’

British political scientist Timothy Mitchell, head of Middle Eastern Studies at Columbia University in New York, recently visited Cairo and delivered a few lectures at the American University based on his new book ‘Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil.’

Mitchell’s first book ‘Colonizing Egypt’ stirred wide controversy within historical circles since he wrote not only about the history of colonization in Egypt, but also about the penetration of the “colonial” disciplinary tactics that characterized the modern state in general, in administrating governance in Egypt under Muhammad Ali and his successors’ in the 19^th century.

In his latest book, Mitchell discusses the hypothesis that oil harms democracy, not through studying the impact of oil revenues on regimes, but through studying the process of extracting and processing oil itself; the difference between that industry and the age of coal, and the impact of each of on social movements in different countries.

Dr. Mitchell, what is the image of Egypt in American academic circles?

It is not good, primarily due to a lack of in-depth knowledge.  All know the news circulated in the media: there is an elected Muslim Brotherhood president and there are subdued problems between the new authority and the army, but they, including me, are not well aware of what is happening now in the streets of the Egyptian cities, including strikes, sit-ins, and tensions.

How do you view the transformations of that Egyptian image since the beginning of the revolution?

During the early days, everyone was watching what was happening in Egypt more than what had happened in Tunisia or even later in Syria. What happened then was different because Egypt is the largest country in the Arab world and what happened was unprecedented and full of surprises and excitement: daily battles in the streets between citizens and the regime, and nobody could know what would occur the following day. But after the end of the first stage, things started taking different forms. Some have become frustrated by the inability of the peoples of the region to reach better outcomes, some are waiting for the end of that stage and the beginning of a new revolutionary stage, while others consider what happened as just a gust and things are in their way to calm down with the continuation of the same old circumstances.

Some Middle Eastern politics specialists believe that the presence of the Brotherhood in power now boosts this form of political Islam in the region, which does not have big grudges towards the West, and this is the end of the story.

What do you think of the hypothesis that one of the consequences of the book ‘Orientalism’ by Edward Said—published in the late 1970s—is a state of approbation of all Islamic things by Western academics, which has helped accept the existence of a group like the Brotherhood in Egypt or Ennahda in Tunisia in power?

This cannot be perceived abstractly since the US has a long history of dealing with the Islamic forces in the region; the oldest of which may be the American-Saudi relations. Perhaps the Saudi regime is not an Islamic one, but it is largely based on religious authority, and this American approach dates back to the 1950s and 1960s, which was then adopted in order to confront the Iranian revolution.

Later on, they thought of the risks of political Islam and its getting out of control. This was what prompted the American Administration to keep Mubarak’s regime for fear of the advent of another Iran in the region. And with the advent of the Egyptian revolution, the Americans welcomed the running of Khairat El-Shater for the presidential elections because they could reach an understanding with him as a businessman who knew his limits and knew what he wanted and what he did want, and he absolutely did not want to stir up internal or external problems, particularly with Israel, which was eventually what the Americans wanted from the governor of a state like Egypt.

Surely, this was better than a new popular government, a leftist government, or even a government headed by a businessman like Naguib Sawiris who might want to make economic development but did not have a popular support that would protect him from problems. Therefore, they were glad to deal with that experience, but now the situation is changing, especially with the Brotherhood’s inability to control the situation.

If these anxious and tense situations in Egypt and Tunisia persist, do not you think that that will drive the West, USA in particular, to change their attitudes towards the rule of political Islam?

This depends on the proposed alternatives. If the Brotherhood steps down, what is the alternative? The only alternative now is the military, or the old regime’s symbols. Therefore, they may believe that the Brotherhood is the most appropriate choice for the status quo. They may think that they can pressure Morsi and his government in order to accept the IMF terms, an important step for implementing the American economic agenda.

I cannot confirm absolutely, but I believe the Americans are glad with their cooperation with Morsi since they have lost none of their privileges they used to enjoy under Mubarak, and they may even gain more privileges, which is a practical and pragmatic way of thinking, let alone the fact that they respect “democratic” results.

They are surely aware of the tense situation inside the country, but they do not think of this positively because of their concern over “instability.” What frightens Americans most are the Salafists since there has been no clear formula for how to deal with them so far, which is another term in the equation. Despite the current failures of the Brotherhood, they are trying to keep the Salafists away from power, which makes things even tenser.

Media has started using the term “the Second Republic,” referring to the presence of an elected civilian president governing Egypt. Do you believe we are a new republic?

This is somehow true since we are no longer under the same old regime, not because there is a new constitution or that the military establishment seems weaker now, but because of the popular action in place since the start of the revolution. This however does not mean we are under a completely new republic, or that things may get back to the old situation despite the army’s desire to take control once again.

Do you see a change in the performance of the state as a “group of institutions”?

Where is the state? We have isolated islands: the military, the government, the president and the Brotherhood, different ministries, the judges, etc. There is no unified state now. Neither the president nor his prime minister is able to impose his full control, for instance, over the army or the judiciary, or even the ministries themselves. We often have fighting and competing centers of power, and every centre does not want to succumb to another center, but tries to strengthen its position far from the issue of unifying the forces of the state as a whole.

Would this situation persist?

I do not think so since we are still in a revolutionary situation. On the other hand, we must admit that we do not know what the revolution is. What has happened since January 25, 2011 has changed many concepts concerning the revolution that had previously focused on what happened in Eastern Europe in the 1990s, the French Revolution, or the revolutions for liberation from colonialism. But what has happened here is different because it aims at creating a new formula for the state where the concept of institutions and law is respected and the army has a specified role, rather than a hidden state which has its own huge economy within the apparent state. However, I cannot tell where things can go from here.