Was it a cinematic happy ending for the recent crisis (the reasons of which are still unknown) between the military and Mohamed Morsi? Or has the final chapter in that crisis yet to be written, pending a new round between the two sides, given that the faces in the photograph published by media suggest that what is in the heart, is still in the heart?

Was it a cinematic happy ending for the recent crisis (the reasons of which are still unknown) between the military and Mohamed Morsi? Or has the final chapter in that crisis yet to be written, pending a new round between the two sides, given that the faces in the photograph published by media suggest that what is in the heart, is still in the heart?

The crisis between the Muslim Brotherhood and their representative in the Presidential Palace, Dr. Mohamed Morsi, is neither over Egypt’s future as some political activities are trying to imply nor over the military’s refusal to Ikhwanize the state as some newspapers mentioned. It is rather a struggle for hegemony since the president, as a member of an autocratic group, wants to control the army – and eventually all sections of the state – to ensure that it will not turn against him, given that it is, for him and the Brotherhood, a black box whose content is unknown. And it seems that Morsi’s attempts to open that box on more than one occasion have failed, which has made him even more anxious.

On the other hand, the military wants to maintain its position as an establishment superior to all state institutions and it fears that its privileged status, which was one of the trademarks of the July 23rd state (revolution anniversary), will come to an end if Morsi succeeds in taking control.

In light of the uneasiness on both sides, they both chose the media to be their playing field and they eventually met on April 11, but it is unknown whether that meeting ended or just froze the crisis.

A few weeks earlier, a published statement attributed to anonymous sources stated that Morsi’s efforts to dismiss Lieutenant General Abdul Fatah Al-Sisi—Egypt’s highest ranking military official— is like playing with fire, which is a veiled threat to the president, implying that Al-Sisi is a red line that should not be crossed. Morsi’s administration denied any plans to dismiss Al-Sisi, although the latter is not completely reassured, a feeling vindicated by news published by all private newspapers about a Brotherhood’s American-backed plan to impair the military and dismiss Al-Sisi. The anonymous sources of this news are most likely military sources and the language used in the leaked news seemed to be carefully chosen.

Of course, some newspapers took the opportunity to capitalize on the situation and this was evident by discovering and publishing an anti-military poem written by a Brotherhood member some time ago or by posting statements attributed to another member against top army officers.

In order to improve its position during the negotiations with the military, Morsi’s administration leaked a number of pages from the fact-finding committee’s report on the January 2011 revolution events to the British Guardian newspaper – the most supportive, amongst all British newspapers, of Morsi up to the issuance of the repressive constitutional declaration – stating that the army took part in the torturing and killing of demonstrators during the eighteen-day revolution.

Simultaneously with the publication of those pages, the president called for a meeting with members of the Higher Council of Armed Forces, a meeting that ended with the aforesaid commemorative photo.

The leaking suggests that Morsi does not have total control over the national media so as to use it in his internal struggles, and also that Morsi’s Administration wants to give its conflict with the military an international dimension.

What is certain though is that the reasons, if any, behind the rift between the two sides is restricted to the powers each seek to hold. Besides, the president wants to send a message to the opposition that he is the highest authority and that his opponents should accept whatever he offers.

It is also certain that the meeting will not end the tension between the two sides because other elements have become parts of the equation, including the United States, Morsi’s main backer, which has considerable influence over the military and wants it to be a counterweight in the Egyptian balance of power. This means that America will not accept Morsi’s attempts to control the army, become the supreme ruler, eliminate his opponents and eventually defy the Americans themselves. In short, it wants Egypt to adopt a type of Pakistani-style regime in terms of the relationship between the military and civilian authorities.

A military coup against the president is an unlikely scenario because ever since the Camp David Accords— talks between the United States,  Egypt and Israel, which led to signing of the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty—the Egyptian army became a key element in a regional security structure whose terms dictate any move it may take.

Therefore, if taking center stage in the political arena in Egypt would be in the best interests of that security structure, the army will not hesitate to do so, but right now we are in the midst of a game of “new nations” and the relationship between Morsi’s Administration and the military is one of its cards, while all the internal happenings are only auxiliary factors and are not the key elements which dictate each side’s moves.

However, one should not overlook what is happening on the streets of Egypt because the masses’ mood and action could force all sides to change their strategies, which is exactly what happened during the eighteen-day revolution, as did the demonstrations before the Presidential Palace last November when they succeeded in changing the U.S. relationship with the Brotherhood and their representative in the presidency.