Following the assassination of leftist political activist Chokri Belaid on February 6, 2013, Hamadi Jebali, the Prime Minister and Ennahda Movement’s Secretary General, presented an initiative to form a government of technocrats. Because of Ennahda’s rejection of his initiative, Jebali, who refused to re-form a government tailored to suit his party’s specifications, decided to step down. Does this mark the starting point for a split within the ranks of the Islamic party?

Following the assassination of leftist political activist Chokri Belaid on February 6, 2013, Hamadi Jebali, the Prime Minister and Ennahda Movement’s Secretary General, presented an initiative to form a government of technocrats. Because of Ennahda’s rejection of his initiative, Jebali, who refused to re-form a government tailored to suit his party’s specifications, decided to step down. Does this mark the starting point for a split within the ranks of the Islamic party?

Tunisians and Arabs alike are not used to witness open rifts taking place within the ranks of Muslim Brotherhood movements. In Tunisia, it seemed extremely unusual for Ennahda to show such disagreement in public since it consistently concealed its disputes behind invincible walls of utter secrecy. Not long ago, Ennahda was counted among the most organizationally cohesive movements, compared to other Tunisian parties.

Secrets behind Jebali’s initiative

Regardless of Ennahda’s diplomatic discourse, which tried to play down the extent of its internal rift, Jebali’s latest move, as an emerging star at present, supported by a few members of his movement and a large number of opposition and civil society activists, may be politically interpreted in two ways: to save the transitional path, or to salvage Ennahda itself through relieving it from the cumbersome burdens of governance and preparing it for the next elections campaign away from the consequences of security, political, economic, and social failures accumulated throughout the troika experience.

Jebali walked down a rough terrain when he publicly declared the opposite of what Ennahda had tried to promote when it came to power, of being a coherent and disciplined movement acting according to the decisions taken by its hierarchical structures, regardless of the differences and anticipated predictions.

The resigned prime minister has caused an unprecedented shock that has deeply affected the political scene, manifested in his disobedience against his movement as well as his messages primarily addressing that movement which in turn failed to show proper decorum towards its secretary general, rejecting his initiative and threatening a breakaway with him.

Several Ennahda leaders have tried to downplay the tug of war taking place inside Ennahda. Samir Dilou, a young leader of Ennahda and the Minister of Human Rights and Transitional Justice, stressed that Ennahda was coherent, and that there were no hawks and doves within its ranks.

Ennahda’s members who de-emphasize the differences within it say there have been no cases of angry disobedience, resignations, or even threats of resignation, compared to other parties and government partners, like the Congress for the Republic Party and Ettakatol, which both witnessed withdrawals and resignations that nearly devastated them.

Even when the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) member tendered her resignation from Ennahda and severely criticized its behavior and its leader through the media, head of the parliamentary block for Ennahda, Sahbi Atigue, hastened to deny those statements and refused her resignation.

Similarly, the sharp critical statements made by Ennahda deputy leader, Abdelfattah Mourou who is also one of its founders, to a French media outlet were underestimated, and viewed as an expression of opinion which was taken out of context.

Indeed, talk about Ennahda’s cohesion, coherent organizational structures, disciplined hierarchy, and members’ loyalty to the chief leader has been a conspicuous feature of Ennahda even before assuming power when Ennahda opposed to the dictatorial regime of former President Ben Ali. Back then, there was strong coordination among its leaders in prisons and abroad, with Sheikh Rashid Ghannoushi at the top of these two leaderships.

Power struggle

With Ennahda directly coming on top of the governing hierarchy and given the frequent mismanagement of state affairs, it has been clear that two leaders or centers of power have emerged within the same party; the power of ‘Montplaisir’ –where Ennahda headquarters is situated – led by Rashid Ghannoushi, and the power of Qasaba – where the Prime Ministry is located – led by Hamadi Jebali. The former is supported by hawks, including Minister of Agriculture Mohammed bin Salim and Minister of Health Abdullatif Makki, while the second is supported by dovish members, like Ennahda’s deputy leader, Abdelfattah Mourou.

During the recent Ennahda conference held in the summer of 2012, disputes and conflicting ideas emerged. However, the arising differences have been shelved for another two years in a bid to avert further disintegration of Ennahda. That maneuver nevertheless could not contain the emerging disputes, which have soon found their way to the media.

Although the disputes have different reasons, this time, thanks to Jebali’s initiative, there has been a head-on confrontation between Ennahda’s leader and his loyalists, on one hand, and its Secretary General and his public or secret supporters, on the other.

Old disputes

Jebali is the most well-informed source of the inner secrets of Ennahda Movement which earned its name in February 1989 in response to a law that prohibited the establishment of political parties based on religious grounds. It had been founded under the name of “Movement of the Islamic Tendency” on June 6, 1981 at a press conference held by Rashid Ghannoushi, Ennahda’s current leader, and his deputy, lawyer Abdelfattah Mourou.

These two leading figures founded the movement in the late 1960s, as an Islamic group which held its first organizational meetings secretly in April 1972. Among its prominent activists were Dr. Moncef Ben Salem, Solh Karkar (died in 2012), Habib el-Mokni, and present Interior Minister Ali Laarayedh.

During that period, spanning nearly forty years, the movement has experienced many splits, most importantly the defection of Mourou and the consequent freezing of his activities, following the movement’s involvement in acts of violence, including the attack on former regime’s party HQ on February 17, 1991. The movement claimed responsibility for those attacks in February 2011.

The emerging differences within the movement have been due to not only violence, but also concepts and method of working.

The movement has not adopted a unified attitude about democracy, religious fanaticism, or salafist currents. During his twenty year-long exile in Britain, Rashid Ghannoushi did not make a single statement condemning the violence committed by Islamist movements. Moreover, the lenient attitude presently seen in Tunisia vis-à-vis the post-revolution Islamic currents has contributed to the confusion experienced by public opinion.

Movement insiders admit the existence of splits within its ranks, between old and young generations, migrants and non-migrants, and jailed members and others who suffered no corporal punishment.

The most significant problem experienced by the movement was the 21/15 split, and the breakaway of the hardline wing, which now leads the salafist groups. That move, according to deputy leader of the Ennahda bloc at NCA, Walid Banaani, was negligible and did not affect Ennahda’s cohesion, operation mechanisms or work approach.

Scenarios

While the course of events and facts suggests a conflict within Ennahda, its leaders emphatically assert, with utter confusion and escalating tension, that such circulated stories are mere vagaries, and that Jebali is a key figure of Ennahda and its secretary general, considering such stories as wishful thinking promoted by Ennahda opponents who bear grudges towards it and seek to destroy it.

This attitude has been met with denial by some political leaders like Beji Caid El-Sebsi, Chairman of Call for Tunisia Party and one of the most prominent founders of the quintet alliance (Alliance for Tunisia), who does not wish to see Ennahda sliding into disintegration or struggle for power because, he believes, this is likely to harm the country’s security and its democratic transition. El-Sebsi’s position is also supported by Najib Chebbi, chairman of the Republican Party and his ‘Alliance for Tunisia’ partner, who does not want the Sudanese experience to be replicated in Tunisia, in a clear reference to the conflict between Omar Hassan al-Bashir—the president of Sudan— and Hassan al-Turabi—former ally of al-Bashir who had al-Turabi imprisoned.

However, some political analysts believe that Jebali will ultimately form a new party that is likely to enjoy full support of many Islamic organizations and even some national figures who have always believed Jebali represents the deep-seated Tunisian identity and well understands Tunisia’s well-established role and rich history.

On the other hand, analysts who are skeptical about the intentions of the Islamist movement believe that Jebali’s resignation, which has positively affected Tunisians in general, is a highly perceptive scenario in preparation for the upcoming elections due to be held in less than a year, and that Ennahda, through this tactic, has overcome the dilemma of searching for a presidential candidate.

Whatever the case is, it is well established that more than a stone has been recently thrown in the Islamic movement’s waters, which has been stagnant for quite a long time now.