Tunisia’s ruling troika—consisting of the the Ennahda Party, the Congress for the Republic Party (CPR) and the Ettakatol Party— was not officially announced as an alliance between ‘moderate Islam’ and ‘moderate secularism’ but as an alliance between the forces that took part in the revolution and paved the way for it through their struggle against dictatorship.
Tunisia’s ruling troika—consisting of the the Ennahda Party, the Congress for the Republic Party (CPR) and the Ettakatol Party— was not officially announced as an alliance between ‘moderate Islam’ and ‘moderate secularism’ but as an alliance between the forces that took part in the revolution and paved the way for it through their struggle against dictatorship.
The troika as an ideological term was only mentioned in some interviews by foreign media (especially Western media) with leaders of the three parties, particularly the Ennahda leader, Rashid al-Ghannushi, who has in more than one occasion said that Tunisia is giving the world a new model in governance, based on an alliance between Islamic and secular currents for the first time in Tunisia’s history.
This ideological term implies that evaluating Tunisia’s experiment in governance and envisaging its future will be based not only on the ability of those parties to realize the revolution’s objectives and successfully negotiating the transitional period’s economic and social challenges, but also on how long this coalition will continue in light of the deep disagreements between the Islamic factions and the secular ones.
The question raised by many observers today is: What is the future of this coalition? This seems a legitimate question in light of not only the contradicting ideologies of each current but also the disagreements, which emerged during the discussions inside the National Constituent Assembly, (NCA) over incorporating Sharia as a source of legislation in the new constitution, in addition to issues such as women’s rights, gender equality and the universality of human rights.
Mutual hostility
Historically, the relationship between the two currents in Tunisia has always been mutual hostility since the establishment of Tunisia as an independent state under Habib Bourguiba, who was regarded as secularist and modernist.
Islamists believe that secularists are the reason behind the westernization of the country and that they are behind targeting Tunisia’s Arab and Muslim identity through the educational and cultural choices adopted by the state’s public policies.
There was no real meeting between the two currents unless on very few occasions and for pure political reasons (in the early 1980s when Mohammed Mzali was prime minister).
The beginning of Ben Ali’s rule was marked by releasing Islamists from Bourguiba’s prisons and by optimistic statements by Rashid al-Ghannushi who said at the time: “I am absolutely certain that Ben Ali’s approach will restore the Islamic and Arab nature of Tunisia, return its status in the greater Arab Maghreb, and end the reign of westernization, as well as the elimination and distortion of our Arab identity and heritage.”
The relationship between the two currents dropped back down to zero in the early 1990s and Ennahda described the campaign against Islamists as “a plot to dry up sources and attack Islam in Tunisia.” It also accused secularists and leftists of formulating that plot to eradicate Islamists, deeming secularist’s domination over state institutions and security forces under Ben Ali as a scheme to “wipe out Tunisia’s Arab and Muslim identity.”
A common goal
However, the events in the mid 1990s showed that things were going in a very different direction and that the crackdown against Islamists was a prelude to crushing any serious opposition to the regime. Arrests included leftist parties, nationalistic activists, etc. Moreover, all active human rights organizations were suppressed and the media was strictly controlled, which made the general scene in Tunisia a struggle against a dictatorship, which did not discriminate between an Islamist and a secularist.
After the country fell under Ben Ali’s iron fist, the talk about the eradication of the Islamic current in favor of westernization diminished. This was observable in the literature of both Islamic and secular currents and also in the discussions between secularists, leftists and Islamists inside prisons. Those discussions laid down the foundation of a partnership between secularist (in the opposition) and Islamists in the face of dictatorship.
This partnership culminated in mass hunger strike by Islamists, leftists and nationalists in October 2005, which gave rise to the ‘October 18th Commission for Freedoms’, which was considered a political alliance between secularists and Islamists, designed to achieve common goals: public and personal freedoms, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, a civil state and women’s rights, which made it a shiny example of a successful Islamist-secularist alliance.
Unfortunately, that alliance was destined to be short-lived, and internal disagreements began to surface at the beginning of 2009, making it an empty framework. All sides tried to revive this alliance on many occasions until the overthrow of Ben Ali’s regime with the January 14th revolution.
It is fair to say that the revolution was the true testing ground for the October 18th alliance, when all political parties announced their programs and the contradictions between Islamists and secularists over key issues such as the secular nature of the state, women’s rights, universality of human rights, resurfaced.
Despite the letters of reassurance sent by Ennahda, a number of statements made by some of its leaders exposed those contradictions, deteriorating the Islamist-secularist alliance.
After the elections on October 23, 2011 the failure of any party to have an absolute majority, although Ennahda won most seats, the troika emerged as an alliance inside the NCA, designed to form a majority in order to enable it to become a ruling alliance (dividing the three presidencies; NCA chairmanship, prime ministry and presidency, between them) to lead the transitional period.
Leaderships of the three parties have responded to all criticisms leveled at the troika, accusing it of fragility and an inability to survive, by saying that it is a strategic alliance and that Tunisia’s national interests lie in the survival of this alliance, which gives the world an unprecedented model of coexistence and partnership between two currents previously characterized as discordant.
Observed discourse
That discourse has been intended for the outside world, primarily the Americans and the Europeans who are carefully watching the rise of political Islam to power, and not to Tunisians whose main concerns are security, social stability, revival of the economy and reduction of unemployment.
Now, one year after the NCA establishment and the declaration of the Islamist-secularist alliance to lead the transitional period, the relationship between the two doesn’t seem rosy. The contradictions which can no longer be covered by sugarcoated publicized statements or by emphasizing that this alliance is strategic have become more and more visible. The debate about the preamble and some chapters of the new constitution, such as the enforcement of Sharia and gender equality, has made each side go back to its corner and to its ideology.
This situation has prompted CPR and Ettakatol to say on more than one occasion that their alliance with Ennahda doesn’t include the drafting of the new constitution; in other words it doesn’t include ideologies; a move regarded by many as a fatal blow to the ideological description of the troika.
Moreover, CPR and Ettakatol have made it clear on more than one occasion that they disagree with Ennahda over many political issues, even accusing it of ghoulishness and that it is attempting to control all state institutions. Within a short period, their discourse became similar to that of the opposition, resulting in growing senses of doubt within the Ennahda circles, prompting it to seek new alliances under various pretexts.
One may conclude that the ruling troika will not survive the next elections and that describing it as an alliance between Islamists ad secularists is merely for external marketing while, in fact, it is an electoral alliance inside NCA and a political alliance designed to share the administration of Tunisia during the transitional period.
