In the final part of an interview with National Transition Council Chairman Abdul Jalil, he explains the difficult job ahead in dealing with insecurity in Libya and the power of money and fear in handling this challenge. He advises the president of the General National Congress (GNC), Mohammed Magariaf, to watch his statements and steps carefully lest the media should criticize him.  Jalil’s final words of wisdom.

How do you evaluate the GNC’s performance?

In the final part of an interview with National Transition Council Chairman Abdul Jalil, he explains the difficult job ahead in dealing with insecurity in Libya and the power of money and fear in handling this challenge. He advises the president of the General National Congress (GNC), Mohammed Magariaf, to watch his statements and steps carefully lest the media should criticize him.  Jalil’s final words of wisdom.

How do you evaluate the GNC’s performance?

As members of the National Transitional Council (NTC), we have undertaken to support the GNC, and he who goes back on his word, the Lord will punish him. On the other hand, the names elected for the GNC are excellent and are first-class strugglers at home and abroad, including battalions’ commanders, such as Muhammad Kilani and Salah Badi, as well as Abdulwahhab Caid who is a leader of the Islamic Fighting Group. Some of them are also fighters by word, imams, and respectable female figures. We count a lot on the GNC, but it, like the NTC, has not got the opportunity to be effective.

Many tragedies have occurred since it came into power, the most repulsive of which was the assassination of the American ambassador, which is a disgrace for the Libyan revolution.  Is this how we reward America and its ambassador while we all know its support to the revolution and how it did its best, through its ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, to issue the no-fly zone Resolution 1973? What all Libyans should know is that we wanted the no-fly zone only, but Rice added “protecting civilians and taking necessary means.” Furthermore, the ambassador to Libya was a respectable figure who supported the revolution and he was, fundamentally, a human being.

In addition, there were the events of Zliten and Bani Walid, the killing of Imran Sha’ban, who captured Gaddafi, and the kidnapping of those who were with him, the killing of members of national security in Sousse, the emergence of Ansar al-Sharia, the demolition of shrines, and disentombing; all of us are Ansar al-Sharia and are Salafis.

The GNC has not had the adequate opportunity to work, although it has been able to create a democratic atmosphere, and develop the internal regulations and the way the candidates present their programs; all of this is considered a model for democratic administration.

What is your evaluation of the performance of the GNC President, Dr. Mohammed Magariaf?

He is an experienced man who earned a doctoral degree in the 1980s and struggled fiercely.  However, I hope he watches his statements and steps carefully because the media, which was excellent until liberation and then overturned and has not treated the GNC and the NTC fairly, is looking for mistakes and highlights disadvantages even if good deeds are many.

Do not you see that the NTC has burdened the GNC with a heavy legacy, namely security and defense, and rebels’ arms?

As members of the NTC, we failed in this concern because the majority of the rebels did not help us, in spite of all the enticements and concessions we presented to them and they gathered behind their arms and camps.

We did not want to confront them, but tried to deal with them politically, contain them, and carry out some of their wishes.  Some accused the NTC of favoring the rebels, which is untrue because we actually favored pacification. Our target was to collect and dismantle the weapons that were in the hands of the rebels, who are unfortunately undisciplined.

Was dealing with the rebels through financial inducements an appropriate solution?

At the time, it was the appropriate and available solution, but it was not really the solution. We became members of the NTC through concurrence rather than elections, we were attacked many times for this reason, and people were satisfied with only a few of us, in contrast to the elected GNC; therefore, we were unable to take some bold decisions.

What is, in your opinion, the solution for security tensions?

Weapons must be collected, and this is possible only by instigating fear or greed. But since we are unable to intimidate anybody, we have to pay money, whether through the campaigns of some satellite channels, local councils, and universities – enticements and valuable rewards should be provided for this purpose – or through enacting a law authorizing the possession, but not the use, of one firearm.

Some say the city has not been liberated from the battalions of Gaddafi as evidenced by the presence of the so-called “Social Council,” which they consider a kind of a soft coup against the institutions emerging as a result of the revolution, what is your comment?

There has been a lot of gossip about Bani Walid, which was a stronghold of the regime’s remnants during the recent battles, but we did not check this area.

The GNC President, Magariaf, along with a delegation travelled there and discoursed with those present there. He was promised to release some detainees, and they were released. Now, it is up to the GNC, and I believe peaceful solutions are the best.

In Bani Walid, all of those who escaped the chasing rebels have gathered and swayed the people by force. They are trying to hinder the revolution through kidnappings. On the other hand, they may have an acceptable point of view: “Citizens from Bani Walid have long been detained in Tripoli, Misrata, Benghazi, and other cities and they must be prosecuted or freed”, and of course this is an obvious legitimate, rightful and lawful demand.