Barely a month since Libya’s first post-Gaddafi elections, the Supreme Security Committee has been overwhelmed by ongoing violence. Last week, Sufi shrines were demolished by extremists while police allegedly looked on. This led interior minister, Fawzi Abdel A’al, to resign from his post, only to withdraw his resignation two days later.
All of this happened only one week after Eid— the holiday that marks the end of Ramadan— when bombs rocked a major street in Tripoli and left at least two people dead, according to authorities.
Barely a month since Libya’s first post-Gaddafi elections, the Supreme Security Committee has been overwhelmed by ongoing violence. Last week, Sufi shrines were demolished by extremists while police allegedly looked on. This led interior minister, Fawzi Abdel A’al, to resign from his post, only to withdraw his resignation two days later.
All of this happened only one week after Eid— the holiday that marks the end of Ramadan— when bombs rocked a major street in Tripoli and left at least two people dead, according to authorities.
Head of the Supreme Security Council’s Tripoli Branch, Hashim Besher, explains the role of the SSC members and the uphill battle of securing the capital since the revolution.
Mr. Besher, there are accusations from the street that the Supreme Security Committee participated in the recent demolition of shrines and digging of graves. Do you really have control over the security situation?
We strongly condemn the acts that have occurred and we, as a security institution, did not participate at all in such operations. Some individuals belonging to the committee acted on their own and they do not represent the commission.
We have not been able to handle these operations by force due to the large numbers of participants, and the fact that they took place in six or seven locations at the same time, making it a difficult task for us.
How has the resignation of the Minister of Interior, Mr. Fawzi Abdel Aal, and then his reversal of it, affected the performance of the security authorities in Libya?
It is the Supreme Security Committee’s task of maintaining security in all circumstances, regardless of any official leaving office or staying in it. We avoid entering into any discussions that take away from the heart of our work.
What are the latest findings of the SSC investigations vis-à-vis the bombings that took place in the morning of Eid in Tripoli?
We can say that those bombings didn’t happen all of a sudden. We had been tracing preparations for almost three months. When we stormed the house of a suspect – Salah Abu Ameed – at Amiriah in Aziziya, in the south of Tripoli, we discovered a strong connection between cells of the former regime’s supporters in Tripoli and cells in other cities.
We received the first tip when a main suspect, Khairi Jarmi, confessed that he had given money to Abu Ameed to buy detonators and explosives. We found the first bomb on the 25th of June in Tripoli before it exploded.
The discovery of other bombs followed in succession and the SSC members were able to defuse all of them, except the one that targeted a military police station at Rasheed Street on the 4th of August. It’s worth mentioning that all of the defused bombs had serial numbers: 1 to 17.
Then came the known Eid incident, though we thwarted four bombings in many regions in the capital that day. A number of rebels and SSC members were targeted through a bomb placed in front of a restaurant they frequently visited in Omar Mukhtar St. Indeed, the bomb exploded and two people were killed. A few hours later, there was another bombing in Jakarta Street behind the Ministry of Interior where we were able to defuse a bomb but not the other one. The defused bomb wasn’t numbered as usual; rather, the word ‘Eid’ was written on it.
Having had some relevant information, the Investigation and Evidence Collection Department (IECD), began moving through on-site investigations and the number of the car bomb. It managed to track the main suspect who then led us to the crime perpetrator at 2:30 p.m. the same day. Afterwards, we tracked down all the suspects who were found to have connections with Gaddafi’s fugitive agents in Tunisia and Egypt.
Why hasn’t SSC showed the accused to the media?
I actually admonish the media because they demand that we reveal all information and show the accused once we catch them, which contradicts the simplest security principles. However, the public understands our motives to conceal some information and they know that we work for their interests.
It’s also our duty to reassure the public that things are under control and the best proof that citizens do feel reassured is the large crowds at the Eid prayer in Shuhada Square, near the bombing site, after the incident.
How were these sleeper cells able to work comfortably during that period while you knew their movements and whereabouts?
Most of them used forged papers and some even used rebels’ cards. It’s no secret that people in some Libyan regions are still loyal to Gaddafi. In other words, their bodies are with us but their hearts curse us.
We try not to commit mistakes or wrong anyone; we aren’t against those who support Gaddafi peacefully, but we are against those who try to lead the country into violence and resist the state legitimacy. For this end, IECDs have been established at all SSC branches in order to track former regime agents and those against Libya and the revolution.
Tribalism and regionalism are the greatest obstacles. We can only arrest a wanted person from another city after we visit the local SSC branch and this often fails due to tribalism. Even when we capture a wanted person, delegations rush from his city and sometimes state officials interfere to cut him loose.
Can we be sure that these terrorists receive support from abroad, whether from the former regime officials or from others?
This is certainly the case. IECDs have managed to investigate this and prove it; the suspects were frequently spotted entering Tunisia, Egypt, Niger and Algeria. Meanwhile, when we arrested suspects we discovered phone calls made between them and some fugitive suspects abroad.
Are all the SSC arrests and detentions made through legal warrants and sound measures?
Unfortunately, 70% of such operations are done without warrants, as raids and arrests are often made in the act, especially by support companies. However, the investigation, arrest, documentation and information departments carry out their work using sound measures and official warrants.
Are all Tripoli prisons under the Ministry of Justice?
No! Only Maftouh prison delivered last November and Ain Zara prison, while Ruemi prison has been affiliated with the Ministry of Interior.
We have issued orders to abolish all the prisons affiliated with the rebels companies in Tripoli and no company is allowed now to create any prison or detention center within its premises. We have also mandated inspection and follow-up offices to follow-up this operation and have allowed suspects to be detained for a maximum of 48 hours within the company; afterwards, they should be referred to the SSC.
What about the SSC prospects in light of the transfer of power and the approaching date of state institutionalization?
This is purely legislative and at the hands of the General National Congress (GNC), which was elected by the people, and of future governments arising from that. I’d like to note that the immediate cancellation of SSC or any hasty action would cause a disaster because SSC has been the main gate to contain large numbers of rebels, and this has spared the country much trouble.
The number of the SSC workers is around 150,000 yet only a few of them are actually operating. How will you address this defect?
A plan is being developed to organize those workers, integrate them scientifically in the state permanent security services and transfer the excess personnel to the Ministry of Labour to decide the best option for them.
Can we say that there is insecurity in the capital?
In order to be able to judge the security situation, we should consider all the circumstances: there are still the ex-convicts and criminals whom Gaddafi released and used as thugs against the rebels, the agents who work against the country at home and abroad, arms proliferation and inefficient state institutions. Under the circumstances, we can say the security situation is good.
To ensure security, the GNC should enact laws to criminalize the possession and trading of weapons. Furthermore, a political will should exist to demand that the former regime agents are extradited to close a huge gate of conflict and insecurity.
