Observers of the constitutional referendum battle that took place from January 14-15 will not find it hard to discover that the government-organized campaign tried to make the number of voters appear greater than the number of voters in the 2012 Constitution; not to mention make the number of those who said yes to the new Constitution greater than those who said yes in 2011. 

Observers of the constitutional referendum battle that took place from January 14-15 will not find it hard to discover that the government-organized campaign tried to make the number of voters appear greater than the number of voters in the 2012 Constitution; not to mention make the number of those who said yes to the new Constitution greater than those who said yes in 2011. 

It will also not be difficult for them to discover that this current government has consistently deprived the Muslim Brotherhood of playing its two main cards of propaganda, inside and outside the country: that Morsi’s legitimacy as president was based on the 2012 Constitution and that the Brotherhood rose to power through ballot boxes and confirmed their popularity in more than one election event.

One of the biggest weaknesses of the current transitional authority is that it is an appointed one and not an elected one— these two points have always been stressed by the Muslim Brotherhood officials in the statements they made to more than one foreign official. The referendum and the results that have been reached further deprive the Muslim Brotherhood of playing these two cards and this, in turn, increases pressures on the leaders of the Brotherhood and its members.

This explains the state of anxiety among the Muslim Brotherhood and its youth, especially during the days leading up to the referendum on the constitution and those that followed. This is especially true knowing that the real purpose of the referendum and its propaganda was to demonstrate the people’s support of the road map and to assess the popularity of Marshal Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. 

The very high percentage of those who approved the Constitution— which was more than 98% — means that the majority of the people approve the toppling of President Mohamed Morsi and there is no longer a need to continue stressing that 30 million Egyptians went to the streets demanding his dismissal or to oblige him to hold early presidential elections – an issue which the Muslim Brotherhood Movement always refutes. 

With the referendum, it has become possible to talk to the Muslim Brotherhood using the same arguments that they had been using, an argument which undermines the democratic process and which deals with it as if it is just an issue of ballot boxes. 

The result of the referendum mainly gave legitimacy to the 3 July regime, a legitimacy that has replaced that of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement.  The same ballot boxes, which the Egyptians used to cast their votes on more than one occasion— since 19 March, 2011 and until the election of Morsi as a president—brought different results.  This has a lot of significance because it has completely damaged the pillars of the Brotherhood’s propaganda.

Moreover, it has put an end to the publicity that has been used to mobilize the youth and the members of their movement and which boil down to one sentence:  Morsi will return to power.  Now, this slogan has been emptied of its content and in reality it has no value whatsoever and this means that the morale of the Brotherhood and the Brotherhood itself will soon collapse. 

This will open the door wide for major splits especially since the authorities are putting many restrictions on the movement and have classified it as a terrorist group, not to mention all arrest operations against the Brotherhood’s members and the prosecution of most of them in criminal trials.

Among the most significant results of this referendum is the fact that members of the Salafist groups did not vote, although their leaders were active in popular conferences to mobilize them to vote yes for the new Constitution. 

This has two meanings: first, it means that the leaders do not have control over their popular base, which is a big issue when it comes to the behaviour of the Salafist stream. Second, it means that the Islamic stream is not happy with the stipulations of this Constitution when compared with the old one, which was opening the door for the formation of an Islamic authority.

This means that the propaganda of the Muslim Brotherhood within the religious stream was able to achieve tangible results and made the Salafist reluctant to vote. However, the overall results, when compared to other referendums and elections, confirm that all the popularity of the religious stream, with all of its factions, has significantly declined because of the Muslim Brotherhood experience in government and its violent behaviour after it was removed from power.

This referendum will be the beginning of the end of the Muslim Brotherhood because it is the start of the implementation of the roadmap. It will be followed by presidential and parliamentary elections, which will lead to a decrease in the symbolic legitimacy that the Muslim Brotherhood depends on in its steps against the transitional authority. Moreover, it will put an end to the ethical basis that the external forces were relying on in their support of the Muslim Brotherhood because these forces were justifying their support saying that the Brotherhood came in democratic elections.

It will not be surprising if the Brotherhood resorts to the questioning of the integrity of the electoral process as it did with last week’s referendum because it knows well that the integrity of these elections will open the door wide for the West to abandon its support of the Muslim Brotherhood.