The first result of the Cairo Court for Urgent Matters’ ruling on September 23, which banned the Muslim Brotherhood, is that the writers referring to the regime will again use the term “outlawed” when describing the organization. Yet the Muslim Brotherhood had already been dissolved in the 1940’s and it was dissolved again in 1954 when the Revolution Command Council considered it a political party and dissolved it along with the other political parties in the country. 

The first result of the Cairo Court for Urgent Matters’ ruling on September 23, which banned the Muslim Brotherhood, is that the writers referring to the regime will again use the term “outlawed” when describing the organization. Yet the Muslim Brotherhood had already been dissolved in the 1940’s and it was dissolved again in 1954 when the Revolution Command Council considered it a political party and dissolved it along with the other political parties in the country. 

Ever since then, the organization has been banned and outlawed. When it returned to its political activism in the 1970’s, its work was customary but not legal. However, it has gained its status through its alliance with the regime and the role it had given to it starting from besieging the left political spectrum and confronting it, to removing the religious and legitimate pretext of extremist and terrorist groups, which were calling themselves the Islamic Jihad and Islamic Group. 

Most analysts believe that this strike against the Muslim Brotherhood, following the overthrow of Mohammed Morsi, their representative in the presidential palace, was stronger than the strike of 1954, which marked the start of what the Muslim Brotherhood describes as the “ordeal years.”  However, this ruling has a symbolic value only in the Muslim Brotherhood struggle with the “Egyptian state.” The confrontation between them and the state has reached a very critical and decisive stage and the Muslim Brotherhood has again become a banned group.

The ongoing events in the country show that the Brotherhood will not be participating in the political process without being marginalized in this process. Nevertheless, it will continue to be present on the ground through its activities in some of the villages and provinces, which are considered its stronghold.

The Brotherhood will also continue to have an economic presence through businessmen affiliated with it or through the money flowing from some Gulf States, or from the organization’s international funds. The Muslim Brotherhood will continue to play a role in social work, in poor areas and slums, through its affiliated charities. All this will not be stopped by a court ruling, although this ruling closes the door for all these activities. But it will not be difficult for the Muslim Brotherhood to find means to circumvent the ruling.

Celebrating so soon?

Here, it is important to raise the following question:  Why did the anti Muslim Brotherhood forces celebrate this ruling? The Egyptian government said that this ruling is not final and that it is going to implement rulings issued by specialized courts. With this, it has meant the administrative judiciary, which is expected to issue a similar ruling in the coming days.

Other media forces, which believe that it has won a symbolic battle against the Muslim Brotherhood, have also celebrated the court ruling because it will psychologically pressure the Brotherhood members and stop the popular sympathy of some sectors of the Egyptian society or some areas with the Muslim Brotherhood.

In addition, there are those who believe that the court ruling will open the door for splits within the Muslim Brotherhood or strengthen the status of dissident leaders who are seeking to form another breakaway organization to replace the Muslim Brotherhood on completely different basis.

I am referring here to the “Brotherhood Without Violence” organization, which was created by youth dissidents of the Muslim Brotherhood during the Rabea al-Adawiya protests. The court ruling might also marginalize extremist leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood who are members of the Qutbists stream (named for Sayyid Qutb, who believed the Brotherhood should be a political vanguard for achieving power and confronting secularization and westernization), in favor of moderate leaders who are most probably now leading a dialogue with the state such as Amro Darraj and Muhammad Ali Bisher, who haven’t yet been charged with anything.  

What we see today is that there are diversified conflict means between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood, and a “biting fingers” game between the two sides. The only aim is to reach a settlement formula that gives the Muslim Brotherhood a certain role, but only a marginal one in the political process, in return for stopping the demonstrations and sit-ins. Perhaps what is going on within the 50-member committee is somehow related to this deal.

There are also talks going on, through a mediator, who could be from the al-Nour Party regarding this deal. On the same day of the issuance of the court ruling, some websites published news that members of the committee, who are close to the regime, and who are from the civil stream, have tried to convince other members of the committee to abandon writing in the Constitution that Egypt is a “civil state.” The only reason behind this is the attempt to please the Salafists because they are performing a certain role together with the regime in the Muslim Brotherhood file or to please the Muslim Brotherhood in order to convince them to abandon their protests in return for making compromises in their favor in the Constitution file. This conflict will continue to be open and each party will use the tools available to it such as judicial rulings similar to the court ruling that banned the Muslim Brotherhood but not the civil organization that represents it.  That is to say that the court has banned an already outlawed group but now it has become outlawed “in the media.”