I was 10-years-old on August 12, 1988, when Egyptian police forces stormed the Adam Mosque in Ain Shams. The storming of the mosque, which was planned by Interior Minister Zaki Bader, ignited a violent outbreak of bloody clashes in the area between the Islamic group and the police forces over a period of two weeks. In the literature of ‘The Islamic Group’, an Islamic party, these clashes are known as “the Ain Shams events.”
I was 10-years-old on August 12, 1988, when Egyptian police forces stormed the Adam Mosque in Ain Shams. The storming of the mosque, which was planned by Interior Minister Zaki Bader, ignited a violent outbreak of bloody clashes in the area between the Islamic group and the police forces over a period of two weeks. In the literature of ‘The Islamic Group’, an Islamic party, these clashes are known as “the Ain Shams events.”
I remember that I saw the corpse of a bearded man soaked in his blood that day. A few minutes after this incident, one of my childhood friends stopped me when I was on my way home. He was there when the mosque, 2 streets distance from my home, was raided and he saw it all. In a childish way, my friend Ahmad, who was trying to make his voice mature beyond his years, threatened to take revenge on all the Copts because of the raid on the mosque. He finished his threats saying that “the Islamists will kill all the Copts!”
“The Islamists will kill all the Copts!”
The consequences to the burning of the Adam Mosque were drastic. ‘The Islamic Group’, in spite of the curfew imposed by the government at the time, attacked four churches in the area and slaughtered one of the priests. The priest’s daughter, one of my childhood friends, jumped from the window to avoid the same fate and she too died immediately.
After that, our street was surrounded on both sides by security armored vehicles. The situation remained like this for 6 years. Armed police vehicles were deployed near the churches in the area. Young men, who used to live there and play football in the yards during Ramadan, suddenly disappeared. My friend Ahmad told me that one of them committed suicide a year after his release from prison.
Church burnt three times
Our local church was burnt 3 times after these events. My friendship with Ahmad continued for years after this incident until life took us on separate paths. I met him by chance in the centre of Cairo on the day I was leaving Egypt for good to settle in Britain and we warmly said goodbye to each other. But I still can’t understand why Ahmad wanted to kill all the Copts on that day.
History repeats itself
Just two days after the 25th anniversary of the Ain Shams events, history repeated itself in a tragic and wearying manner. A few hours after the crackdown of the Rabia al-Adawiya and the al-Nahda squares sit-ins by state police forces, tens of churches were subject to retaliatory simultaneous attacks in at least ten provinces (Giza, Fayoum, Beni Suef, al-Minya, Asyut and Sohag, Luxor, Alexandria, Suez and North Sinai) by Muslim Brotherhood supporters.
These attacks were not at all surprising. When the army overthrew President Morsi on the 3rd of July, the Muslim Brotherhood launched a systematic sectarian mobilization campaign, evidenced by the slogans and curses written on the walls of the churches and the houses of Copts in many provinces.
Brotherhood blame Copts for their plight
Slogans that read: “O worshipers of the Cross, this is an Islamic state.” Slogans against the perceived betrayal of al-Sisi and the Christians. Moreover, in 5 provinces, there were acts of sectarian violence. Copts are accused by the Muslim Brotherhood not only of participation in the “coup” against them, but also of being the backbone of the mass demonstrations that were organized in preparation for the “coup”.
It is clear that the Muslim Brotherhood, in facing the crackdown, is using two parallel techniques. First, a discourse of grievance denouncing the state use of excessive force and second, a very well prepared plan to attack police stations, prisons and government buildings en masse in an attempt to create as much chaos as possible in order to reproduce the January Revolution.
Why burn churches?
Nonetheless, the Muslim Brotherhood curates and distorts its alleged humanitarian and moral image, especially vis-a-vis the outside world. It also appears illogical that the Muslim Brotherhood leadership would let them attack targets with no strategic value such as churches, instead of focusing on attacking the state apparatus and security headquarters.
Oppression of the weakest
In light of their inability to confront the superiority and strength of the security services, which outweigh that of the group, the Islamists direct their violence towards the weakest link in society. They blame the Copts for all the crimes and sins committed by the state.
The violence of Islamists is the result of state repression, but possibly also a major axis of the political Islam ideological structure, which seems to want to opppress women, the disabled and other minority factions.
If it is only state violence motivating such attacks, then why did the Muslim Brotherhood continue to use the sectarian discourse when they were in power? Why don’t secularists pour their anger on Copts?
Copts forever escapegoats?
It seems that the Muslim Brotherhood’s main battle lines extend along religious and sectarian lines. The cohesion of the Muslim Brotherhood or other political Islam groups is based on the justification that there is a threat posed by third parties (e.g. the Copts) to the identity of the group, with various factions promoting violence as an answer.
Given the current sectarian attacks and previous historical experiences, it seems that the sectarian campaign against the Copts will not stop in the near future. The armored vehicles of the central security, if any, are incapable of protecting churches and Christian worshippers. The Copts might unfortunately pay the price for a battle in which they are caught in between the hammer of the Muslim Brotherhood sectarianism and the anvil of a weak state whose security forces are unable to perform their role in protecting citizens.
