What happened was, of course, a “soft” coup, as the army turned against Mubarak on February 11, 2011, and “sided” with the popular will and forced him to step down.
What happened was, of course, a “soft” coup, as the army turned against Mubarak on February 11, 2011, and “sided” with the popular will and forced him to step down.
In 2011, everyone cheered, and rosy hopes of a prosperous future for all Egyptians, a future free from fear, repression and corruption, flourished. Then, the Muslim Brotherhood rushed to shake hands and ally with the military before they could turn against them. The second time, the Muslim Brotherhood found only the word “legitimacy” to repeat in truth and falsehood. In his last speech, the former president threw it in the face of listeners dozens of times, as if he wanted to emphasize what he missed.
Mohamed Morsi became president of Egypt with 51.7% of the vote. It is well known that a considerable portion of voters elected him in defiance of his rival, Ahmed Shafiq, the last prime minister in the Mubarak era. The hope was that Morsi would be a president of all Egyptians and attract the other half of the people.
However, Mohamed Morsi quickly forgot his promises, issuing a constitutional declaration, in which he put himself above the judiciary. This declaration was fully unconstitutional, and a coup against the Constitution and legitimacy. It is reminiscent of Hitler’s “Enabling Laws,” which also placed the German dictator above the law.
The major sin of Morsi was the exclusion of all non-Islamic political forces and his attempt to “Ihkwanize the State.” The Islamists alone formulated the country’s Constitution, where Mohamed El Sawy, close to the Muslim Brotherhood, was a representative of the Egyptian church! This step alone shows their understanding of the issue of participation. Thus, the Constitution was adopted in one night, in a regrettable manner.
Yes, Mohamed Morsi was elected in a democratic and fair manner (despite all infringements in the election and influencing the will of the voters through religious slogans), but democracy does not stop at the results of the ballot boxes and the method pursued by the government was not democratic at all. Through his decisions, choices, and adherence to failing ministers, Morsi deepened the division in the society, and in a year, proved to be a failure in the management of many problems in the country, especially the economy, national security and the Nile water issues.
All this led to the birth of the Tamarod (Rebel) movement. On June 30, the anniversary of Morsi’s inauguration, millions from all Egyptian governorates took to the streets, demanding an end to the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood.
What happened on June 30, 2013 was, in my opinion, a democratic popular referendum, and the result was clear: The people want an early presidential election. Millions are convinced that Morsi is not able to lead, but leads the homeland in the wrong direction, to the point of drowning.
Yes, what happened was a soft coup, but is based on a broad popular will and a conviction of the failure of the Muslim Brotherhood’s rule. The country was on the brink of civil strife after Morsi’s last speech.
Nevertheless, there are still many concerns: liberal and leftist opposition in alliance with the army is not in favor of democracy in the long term. The pressing questions now are: How will the behavior of the army leaders be in the coming period? Will the last word continue to be theirs? Will the Muslim Brotherhood be treated in the spirit of revenge and retaliation? The campaign of arrests of Muslim Brotherhood leaders confirms this, and the closure of the Islamic channels is a fatal blow to those who defend the freedom of the media.
What is urgently needed now is the return of the Muslim Brotherhood to the political game and the acceleration of a genuine national reconciliation. The opposition, liberal and leftist, is required to demonstrate that it has better alternatives to the Muslim Brotherhood. It is a second beginning of the January 25, 2011 revolution, after being stalled for several reasons, most importantly the mismanagement of the transitional period by the military council. How will the second transition period be managed?