The battle between Libyan government forces, local brigades and forces loyal to ISIS continues for control of the key Libyan port of Sirte, the coastal city between Tripoli and Benghazi where toppled leader Gaddafi was killed in October 2011. Sirte has been under siege since: in the first battle, the city was besieged by rebels coming from the west, most of whom were from Misrata. Soldiers and officers who defected from Gaddafi’s regime came from Barka in the east. Sirte’s battles did not end with the death of Gaddafi.

The battle between Libyan government forces, local brigades and forces loyal to ISIS continues for control of the key Libyan port of Sirte, the coastal city between Tripoli and Benghazi where toppled leader Gaddafi was killed in October 2011. Sirte has been under siege since: in the first battle, the city was besieged by rebels coming from the west, most of whom were from Misrata. Soldiers and officers who defected from Gaddafi’s regime came from Barka in the east. Sirte’s battles did not end with the death of Gaddafi.

Colonel Salah Bouhalika, Commander of the Zawiya Martyrs Brigade, which is part of the Sa’ika Forces, was tasked with protecting Sirte after its liberation. Gaddafi’s demise however left a power vacuum and led to the establishment of Ansar Al-Sharia, an Islamic extremist group based on al-Qaeda’s beliefs, which formed in June 2013. Many members of extremist brigades such as Al-Farouk, Ansar Al-Sharia in Benghazi, Martyrs of Abu Salim in Derna, Sirte Rebels Brigade – as well as foreign Jihadists – joined the group.

A day after its formation, Bouhalika’s forces attacked the locations of Ansar Al-Sharia and killed its leader, Ahmad Al-Tir, who was formerly the commander of the Al-Farouk Brigade in Misrata. His two deputies, Algerian Ali Sasi and Tunisian Hasan Mohamed were also injured.

ISIS takes Sirte in 2013

Months later, a second battle ensued when a much larger force loyal to Ansar-al Sharia from Misrata attacked Bouhalika’s forces and forced them to withdraw from the city towards Benghazi. The allied forces of Ansar al-Sharia in Sirte took over the whole city. The group grew in strength, recruiting huge numbers of Gaddafi’s former military and civil supporters in Sirte and its suburbs, as well as foreign jihadists. The al-Qaeda-affiliated group soon turned into ISIS.

Then came the third battle. General Khalifa Haftar, an experienced military commander, issued a statement in May this year, ordering his forces to move to Sirte to liberate it from ISIS.  The move was blocked by Fayez al-Sarraj, Head of the Presidential Council (PC), who opposed Haftar’s one-sided decision and issued another: an Operation Room to lead the fight against ISIS would be established in the areas between Misrata and Sirte, to be directly led by al-Sarraj himself as the Commander in Chief of the Libyan Army.  

The decision banned any military force from engaging in any operations within the boundaries of Sirte. When Haftar’s forces moved towards Sirte, ISIS carried out a violent attack in the nearby areas it controlled of Abu Kareen, Washka, Zamzam, Kudahiyya, Abunejeim and Boyrat.

As Libyan government forces drew closer to Sirte, a key town between Benghazi and Tripoli, they found ISIS’ black flags raised on buildings. A Tunisian extremist exploded a car bomb at a Misrata brigade checkpoint near the town of Abu Kareen. It left five dead and twelve injured. The military council in Misrata declared full mobilization in the city and called on the brigade leaders and members to return to their headquarters. They formed a special operations room which is not linked to the Presidential Council.

Misrata brigades moving towards Sirte

Misrata’s brigades united and launched what they called “Al-Bunyan al-Marsoos Operation” to liberate Sirte. Al-Sarraj’s government endorsed the operation and considered Misrata’s brigades linked to the PC. He pledged to support them with all they needed and considered Haftar and his army rebellious against the PC’s legitimacy.

The UN special convoy to Libya, Martin Kobler, intervened and supported al-Sarraj’s position when he said in an interview with Le Journal Du Dimanche that Haftar “doesn’t have an army but a dissonant group of Gaddafi army remnants, foreign volunteers, tribal forces, and other French and American forces on the ground.”              

Meanwhile, Haftar’s forces – which were supposedly moving to liberate Sirte and were expected to reach it from the east before Misrata’s forces which were coming from the west – stood back. Haftar chose to send his forces through the desert road to the south of Sirte, where oil is located in the areas of Jalo, Ojala and Zala, while observing the battle between Misrata’s forces and ISIS from a distance. Commentators suggested Haftar was not willing to confront two enemies at the same time. He preferred to wait until one of them won. 

The forces from Misrata however did not hold back and their fast advances deconstructed the idea that many Libyans had of an impregnable ISIS defence. Where were the hundreds of thousands of military vehicles it paraded? Where were the thousands of fighters alluded to in western reports?

What next for Sirte?

The speed at which Misrata’s forces have reclaimed territory from ISIS has led to rumours of a deal between the two fighting factions. Others believe British or American support was provided. Neither rumour is backed by tangible evidence.

Misrata’s forces are about to liberate Sirte from ISIS, but without eradicating it completely. ISIS will remain active in other places. It will conduct terrorist attacks in Misrata and Tripoli. With or without ISIS, a key question remains: how will the people of Sirte, who rejected both ISIS and the Misrata brigades in the past, react to the latter’s advance towards their city? And will Haftar’s forces take advantage of the vacuum? A fourth battle for Sirte could yet begin.