Political researcher, Mohamed Naeim, shares his ideas about the development of Egypt’s national identity since the June 1967 war with Israel. He believes that the January (2011) generation (which overthrew Mubarak) is the closest to overcoming isolation due to its sustainable interaction with the outside world, despite having  inherited a legacy of isolation.

Political researcher, Mohamed Naeim, shares his ideas about the development of Egypt’s national identity since the June 1967 war with Israel. He believes that the January (2011) generation (which overthrew Mubarak) is the closest to overcoming isolation due to its sustainable interaction with the outside world, despite having  inherited a legacy of isolation.

Naeim argued that the January generation did not review its progress over the past five years and that the Islamic movement failed to consider its priorities given the isolation of the military institution and its perceptions about the conspiracy targeting Egypt. Naeim warns that groups that fail to review their perceptions will build positions on false foundations.

Mohammed Naeim, why did you withdraw from the political scene (Egyptian Social Democratic Party) and freeze your membership with the party?

After the January 2011 revolution, the purpose of my engagement in the party emanated from an attempt to prevent the situation from falling apart. The revolution happened in a hurry and was followed by a quick alliance between the army and the Islamist movement.

I thought political activity should be restructured and developed rapidly to avoid what is happening now. Therefore, my engagement in the political party aimed to create a political space and encourage wide-ranging national attempts that would enable the civil forces to struggle on the basis of coexistence.

My doubts about the possibility of realizing that objective increased after the Muslim Brotherhood’s persistence to pass the constitution in December 2012 on a non-consensual basis, coupled with a breakdown of the street at that time and the Islamic movement’s failure to attempt to put forward a new horizon. I felt that the political situation was on the verge of collapsing because the Islamic movement’s forces that led the political activities at that time failed. The calls for June 30 already began, in order to resolve the prevailing conflict and associated mayhem. They could not control and regulate the political environment and had ultimately failed because the then dominating Islamists decided to wage an open-ended confrontation.

The Muslim Brotherhood viewed the millions of protestors who took to the street as a ‘challenge to their legitimacy’. The conflict further deteriorated and the army was given the opportunity to intervene.

For that reason I decided to freeze my activity and quit the party, as I believed that the post-June 30 period was devoid of free political engagement.

So you blame the Islamic political mainstream for what happened?

No doubt. It is natural for the military establishment as a non-civilian institution to be displeased with any other civilian institution. It took advantage of the political vacuum and decided to fill it in when the civilian institutions failed to find proper co-existence formulas. The army was not hidden. It suddenly appeared from March 2011 until June 2013.

All parties thought that the Muslim Brotherhood would soon back away and a negotiated process for a new political situation would begin. It was unconceivable that the Islamic movement would sacrifice 10 million protestors who took to the street for the sake of legitimacy. That was against political logic and it was just absurd that on July 3, the military council called the Liberty and Justice Party for negotiations.

Why did the civil movement not try to fill the vacuum after June 30?

In democratic societies, civil movements exist on the basis of co-existence and peaceful political life. The civil movement did not have an arm and its proponents were the product of the January Revolution. They were still in the formation process and their existence at that point depended on consensus.

After June 30, the civil movement collapsed and joined the political transformation process for fear of oppression. It could not identify its exact position. It was unthinkable that the June 30 mobility would come to that situation at the end. Consequently, all forces joined in because the bet was on the Brotherhood’s surrender.

That takes us to reviewing the constant withdrawal of the civil movement.

The civil movement did not withdraw. It took part in the political process since its early stages. It won 23% of the votes and at the referendum that followed, it got 37%. Its components were more accurately clear during the presidential election. The civil forces hoped that the political process would continue. However, with the continuing escalation of the Muslim Brotherhood, the party that believed in a sustainable political process within the ranks of the civil forces began to falter at the expense of the mounting voices that called for a coup and intervention of the army.

The problem was that the civil mainstream proponents who were the mainstay of the revolution and the interactions that occurred after the revolution led to the alliance between the Islamists and the army in the March 2011 referendum. It was the first time that the army, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis were allied. At that point in time, the civil movement reached a perception about itself. It decided to defy that alliance but failed to develop its thoughts and tendencies and stuck to the term of ‘civility’ as a reaction to the alliance.

The civil movement was accused of failing to find a substitute. What is the logic behind this idea?

The civil movement’s concept was basically set up as a reaction to the alliance between the army and the Muslim mainstream. Fundamentally, it is divided into several ideas and the presidential election was the more important stage to form its thoughts. It divided and began to take a much clearer shape. However, now in a society that supports a violent state policy focused on eradicating any party opposing its ideas, things may seem illogical.

What is your assessment of the current stage?

Old systems are gone once and for all and the new change has yet to come. In between, dirty and scary ghosts are anticipated. We are now at the stage of dirty and scary ghosts. Egypt is in the throes of a new political change and the theoretical dynamics that motivate people are still not strong enough. Thus, movement occurs as a result of an instantaneous state of anger.

What you think about the protest demonstrations of April 10?

The uprising of April 10 led to setting a new date for demonstrations, which was a good thing under a cruel regime. We were exhilarated to discover that that mobility resulted in the arrest of only 100 people. It was more or less reasonable behavior, but if it led to violence, we would have no other option. Therefore, the decision to withdraw and call for fresh protests was an intelligent action.

Under three years of closure of political activities, why has the mobility been confined to foreign policy?

The present conflict over the two islands of Tiran and Sanafir within the framework of border demarcation, amid sealing off of entire streets inside the capital, is attributed to the fact that it is the only possible space through which the civil movement can use the media to create an overall political controversy, i.e. to play on the regime’s narrative regarding national security, sovereignty, territorial integrity and manipulating the regimes’ tools. It is the same equation used by the civil movement during the alliance between the military establishment and the Islamic movement.

What is mobility is likely to bring?

If it succeeded to heighten the cost of repression, that would be a great victory because it would escalate the pace of mobility. During the past three years, the cost of repression decreased. We may recall that Shima Sabbagh was killed on the street in 2015 as she was holding flowers.

How can the civil movement re-open the political arena?

The civil movement should not claim that the current mobility will be crucial because its basic purpose at that moment is to grab more space in the public arena and raise repression cost. However, if the mobility adopted an escalation slogan and demanded to overthrow the regime, it would end quickly as it would not be conscious of its current strength.

I support a mobility that maintains a steady and disciplined pace and then escalates slowly without sustaining losses or allowing the regime to escalate its confrontation in a violent manner. Should the situation escalate and we were obliged to look for a political exit, we can call for referendum.

University youth, who were under 12 years old during the revolution, took part in the current protests. Will they bring anything new to bear at this stage?

Student movements always have their own mechanisms. I believe that this generation is now moving away from patriarchy, which reached its default level among the ranks of students. They abhor the pursued patriarchal attitudes and tendencies. I believe that the social patriarchal structure is not as effective as it used to be in the past due to its failure to come up with a convincing narrative. The general trend at present is that the ruling power failed to meet their aspirations and does not seem to understand them, despite its past failing attempts.

What are the available options through which the civil movement can act?

We have to revise and restructure the ranks within the movement – revision is the key for a serious discussion about what we need or do not need to do. The problem though lies with those who think that revision is likely to make us more confused.