Long before the notorious Islamic State (IS) declared its caliphate in swaths of Syria and Iraq in June 2014, Libyan mujahideen returning from Afghanistan back in 1993, (fighting jihad against Soviet invasion), had already dreamed of establishing a caliphate state on the ruins of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s regime. They were influenced by their military experience and the ideas of Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian Muslim Brother.
Long before the notorious Islamic State (IS) declared its caliphate in swaths of Syria and Iraq in June 2014, Libyan mujahideen returning from Afghanistan back in 1993, (fighting jihad against Soviet invasion), had already dreamed of establishing a caliphate state on the ruins of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s regime. They were influenced by their military experience and the ideas of Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian Muslim Brother.
Jihadist Abdelhakim Belhadj, one of the most prominent warlords (currently in control of Tripoli), succeeded on mobilizing Libyan returnees from Afghanistan under the banner of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG).
The LIFG chose the Jebel Akhdar mountainous area as a stronghold and starting point for the jihadist war against Gaddafi because the area is rugged and therefore suitable for guerrilla warfare.
The LIFG was inspired by Omar Mukhtar in his struggle against the Italian Fascist occupation for twenty years in the highlands. Moreover, the mountain in Cyrenaica was the founding place of the Senussi movement, which was supported by the tribes there as a jihadist religious order of thought, which later turned into a monarchy system that ruled Libya from independence in 1951 to Gaddafi’s coup in 1969.
In this sense, a broad social incubator for the LIFG was formed in the eastern region — the concept of incubator here meaning cautious material support and silent moral support. It did not evolve into an armed popular participation. That support did not necessarily mean religious/ideological commitment to the LIFG’s thought. Besides, the LIFG did not try to impose its ideological thoughts on society nor did it accuse its members of being godless. Its Jihadist project focused on fighting the regime, not only because Gaddafi was a tyrant, but also because he was considered an outright infidel, basing its claim on many fatwas issued by renowned Wahhabi jurists in Saudi Arabia and other countries.
The LIFG was most feared by Gaddafi and they took the war to his doorstep using all kinds of tactics to combat him and his forces inside of cities and in the rugged areas of the Jebel Akhdar Mountains. Gaddafi fiercely fought them for four years inside the cities where they were stationed – Derna, Benghazi, and Ajdabiya – and his air force blitzed their hideouts in the valleys of the Jebel Akhdar. Gaddafi even used Napalm bombs and poison gases against them. In 1997, Gaddafi enacted a fascist law imposing harsh collective punishments against the families, relatives, tribes and even neighbors of his opponents.
In 1999, Gaddafi was successful in crushing the LIFG and hundreds of its members were killed and thousands were imprisoned. Many others migrated to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan and other countries. One example of the iron-handed handling of those insurgencies was the massacre of Libya’s notorious prison named Abu Sleem in which over 1,200 Islamist political prisoners were killed within a few hours on June 29, 1996.
After September 11, 2001, when the then US administration accused individuals and states across the Muslim world of sponsoring terrorism, Gaddafi feared American punishment for his previous terrorist acts – many online documents confirm the enormous fear he felt at the time – to the point that he once appeared on a local TV newscast donating blood for the twin-tower attack victims.
He also phoned his friend Berlusconi and asked him to tell President George W. Bush that he was fully prepared to participate in the War on Terror and to provide US intelligence with names of terrorist groups and individuals around the world. After the fall of Baghdad, Gaddafi voluntarily dismantled his nuclear program and handed over all its equipment and documents. He even bore their freight charges to the US. In return, the CIA and British Intelligence handed over to him LIFG members who were arrested outside Libya, including in 2005 the emir of the LIFG, Belhadj – arrested in Thailand – and the jurist of the LIFG, Sami Saadi – arrested in Hong Kong. In 2006, Libya was removed from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism.
Gaddafi felt he was welcomed back in the world’s international community, especially after receiving British, German and French leaders in his tent. He was particularly overjoyed when Condoleezza Rice visited him in Tripoli. Encouraged by his success in saving himself from the consequences of external terrorism through payment of billions of US Dollars as compensation, he wanted to close his internal terror file relating to Abou Sleem prison massacre and the remaining Islamist prisoners. He resorted to review mediations, similar to those with Islamists in Jordan, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco and Saudi Arabia.
He sought the help of Saudi sheikhs who had previously described him as godless. They started praising him when Saudi Arabia became, through Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the godfather of the solution of the Lockerbie case. He also sought the help of Yusuf al-Qaradawi – the Muslim Brotherhood’s jurist and Qatar’s outstanding super religious star of Al-Jazeera channel. At home, he sought the help of Libyan sheikhs, such as Muslim Brother Ali al-Sallabi, Salafist Sadiq Al-Ghariani – present Mufti of Libya – and their old friend in Afghanistan Noman Benotman who repented after 9/11 – now President of the London-based Quilliam Foundation that focuses on counter-terrorism.
The mediation result was a deal under which prisoners were released in return for declaring repentance and compliance with their ruler, Gaddafi. Accordingly, they moved from a social incubator in which many individuals, families and even cities suffered harsh collective punishment for them to a security incubator that offered them financial compensation and reinstated them or provided them with new jobs. That turnaround happened after they authored a 414-page book titled ‘Corrective Studies on the Concepts of Jihad, Accountability and Judging People’ in which they asked for the despot ruler’s forgiveness.
