“I pledge allegiance to the Commander of the Faithful Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and I promise to obey his orders for better or worse and not to challenge any of his decisions.” With these words of loyalty, Marwan Duwairi, also known as Amino, ended his career as a rap artist who once drank liquor and smoked marijuana.
“I pledge allegiance to the Commander of the Faithful Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and I promise to obey his orders for better or worse and not to challenge any of his decisions.” With these words of loyalty, Marwan Duwairi, also known as Amino, ended his career as a rap artist who once drank liquor and smoked marijuana.
After spending eight months in prison in 2012, Duwairi not only changed his name from Amino to Abu Ayman, he grew his beard and replaced his baseball cap with a black headband worn by all members of the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS). He announced on his Facebook page that he traveled to Raqqa, the heart of the “caliphate.”
What happened to Marwan in those eight months while he was incarcerated has happened time and again in Tunisian prisons over the past decade – it reached its climax in recent years when the state embarked on an anti-terrorism campaign.
A long list of prison jihadi graduates
Duwairi’s prison conversion was similar to Ahmad Rouysi’s – one of the most prominent figures of the banned Ansar al-Sharia leaders. The 30-year-old young man who entered prison before the 2011 uprising on charges of fraud, witchery and drug dealing, left as a leader of terrorist group Ansar al-Sharia.
Similarly, Ayman Hallak entered prison on charges of adultery and fornication with a married woman, but right after he was discharged, he joined terrorist training camps in Darna, in eastern Libya.
Shoaeb .K. entered jail for mobile phone theft and after being discharged he joined IS in Iraq and later blew himself up in Ramadi.
Examples of ordinary prisoners who suddenly turned into remorseless terrorists abound. What happened? And how? Were these young men simply brainwashed?
Repentant criminals
On the dawn of February 16, 2014 in the remote district of Ouled-mana, near the Algerian border, a radical terrorist group led by Raghib Hanashi ambushed a vehicle containing four passengers, including the Chief of Prisons and Rehabilitation Isam Mashriki. Hanashi pulled Mshriki out of the car and sprayed him with eighteen bullets just because he was a prison official or a “despot,” as the radical Salafists prefer to call him. Hanashi had only spent eight months in prison on robbery charges.
Investigations suggest that Hanashi’s transformation took place inside the prison within a relatively short span of a few months. Elements outside had recruited him for future dispatches to the surrounding mountains to become one of the staunchest and most bloodthirsty leaders only a few months after his release.
“Recruitment of terrorists is carried out in two ways,” explained Badra Qaloul, Head of the International Center for Strategic, Security and Military Studies and professor of sociology. “First, ordinary prisoners are manipulated by Takfiris when the prison authority deliberately mixes these Takfiri prisoners with ordinary ones incarcerated for convictions related to drug dealing, rape, murder or robbery, believing that they will force them to co-exist with the most dangerous prisoners. However, these serious offenders ultimately fall prey to the terrorists’ intrigues and narratives about repentance by exploiting the case of prisoners who are ostracized by society.”
The second way, added Qaloul, occurs after these prisoners are released by taking advantage of their negative attitudes against prisons and turning their indignation into a kind of revenge against the bad treatment they received in prison. Recruiters also encourage prisoners to be more furious towards the society that “pushed” them into the world of crime and persuaded them that the shortest way to repentance is through jihad and joining extremist groups.
Hanashi, the ex-convict who brutally shot the prison officer, stands out as a good example of how prison terms serve as platforms for ideological mobilization and inducing hatred in ordinary prisoners who are later groomed into terrorists.
Conducive recruitment environment
There are no accurate figures about the percentage of recruited inmates who join extremist groups. However, recent research released by the International Center for Strategic Studies revealed that the percentage of recruited prisoners range between 30 to 40 percent due to the fragile psychological conditions and limited educational levels of this social group.
There are 27 prisons and six juvenile reform centers in Tunisia. Correction facilities with prisoners convicted of terrorism related cases and affiliated to radical groups are concentrated in large cities such as Mornaguia prison in the capital, Bizerte prison in the north and Houareb prison in Kairouan, in addition to Sfax prison in the south.
The figures released by the interior ministry indicate that there are 1,200 prisoners charged with terrorist cases distributed over Tunisia’s large prisons. Our source revealed that there are 113 women incarcerated on terrorist convictions, most of whom are jailed in the women’s prison in Manouba in Tunis.
Based on the official figures provided by the Prisons and Rehabilitation Authority, the number of prisoners at present comes to about 22,000, which reflects a decline compared with 2014 figure of about 25,000 prisoners. These inmates are distributed over 27 classified prison units.
Sources from the Ministry of Justice in charge of Tunisian prisons, on the other hand, said: “The recruitment processes reached their climax in the last four years following the revolution in Tunis. The prisoners’ files show that one out of three prisoners leaving prison upon completing their terms experienced a behavioral change. The transformation does not occur because of the reform action prisons represent as a punitive institution, but under the influence of the religious brainwashing practiced by the radical religious groups which control most of the dormitories of large Tunisian prisons.”
Sleep, eat then pray
How do the recruitment processes occur? Moreover, what are the elements that lead to their success?
Immediately after a prisoner enters the prison ward, he is received by the extremist prison mates. The recruitment process, according to prison officers, starts with simple effective procedures that aim to influence the newly arrived inmates.
Testimonies provided by several prison officers revealed that extremists often select the most psychologically fragile prisoners who are banned from meeting their families — they might provide them with beds which are too difficult to obtain in prison. They might also allow them to join the collective eating sessions organized by them. These radical groups usually become more active during the month of Ramadan and on certain religious occasions in which food is a major aspect, but they aim, in fact, to polarize and recruit the new prison mates.
Initially, extremists refrain from raising any religious topics with the recruited prisoner. However, after providing him with accommodation and food, they invite him to establish prayer which, according to their preached narrative, represents a main pillar of the Islamic faith.
Having completed this recruitment stage, according to the prison officers, everything else becomes easy, given that these prisoners are more susceptible to accepting religious transformation, call for repentance and purification from their past sins.
As soon as the recruited prisoner keeps to prayer timings, a new stage begins in which he will be inculcated with radical religious thoughts that gradually aim to accuse the state and its institutions of infidelity and apostasy, exploiting the bad treatment prisoners often receive from their jailers.
The selection process of these vulnerable inmates is certainly a well-thought out action by the extremist religious groups inside prisons.
According to many experts in Islamic groups, the transformation relies on concentrating on certain categories characterized by certain psychological, social and cultural traits.
A researcher of jihadist groups Abdul Latif Hanashi said: “There are two distinct categories or kinds of prisoners on which the Salafist and Takfiri groups concentrate to polarize and frame. The first category includes prisoners who are penalized for “social” crimes, especially those charged with moral and drug-related offenses,” he explained.
“The prison sentences of these prisoners range between one and two years and the inmates usually experience improper psychological circumstances such as frustration, remorse and social injustice, as well as a spiritual vacuum and feelings of guilt. These prisoners are usually unconcerned about political affairs and are not framed as such by the prison authorities. They are, therefore, vulnerable to joining the daily sessions held by the extremists to recruit them for post-imprisonment periods in which the Takfirist elements will receive them to complete the recruitment stage initiated in prison and to change them into terrorist elements capable of carrying out operations organized by radical religious groups.”
The second category, according to Hanashi, includes political prisoners affiliated with certain organizations with ‘non-radical’ religious backgrounds. Some of these prisoners are at loggerhead with their organizations or have other political or ideological differences with them. Some of this category’s members might have been subjected to torture during their detention and investigation at the security centers or later inside the prison cells.
Hanashi also added that the polarization and recruitment of prisoners in prisons is an old practice found in the literature of extremist groups — dating back to 1965 when Egyptian jihadist groups used Tura prison and the other Egyptian jails as a breeding ground for churning out new jihadis into society. “This is an undisputable fact especially after the expansion of the activities of extremist religious groups and their representative societies,” Hanashi said.
Conducive environment for polarization
According to the prison authority’s opinion, the success of polarization does not only depend on the success of ideological mobilization since there are other objective circumstances that pave the ground for future transformation. These conditions are concerned with the existing prison infrastructures and its environment, which facilitate the polarization process.
Prison officers themselves, who wished to remain anonymous, admitted that the present prison facilities are poor and insufficient. They believe that the overcrowding problem, which many Tunisian prisons are experiencing at present, represents a significant factor contributing to the success of polarizing and recruiting ordinary prisoners who later join radical religious groups.
The High Commissioner for Human Rights (HCHR) published in early 2014 a report about Tunisian prisons following a number of intensive field visits at the end of 2013. The report revealed that Mornaguia prison, categorized as a detention center, is almost solely dedicated to receiving detainees held for terrorist-related cases. Although the absorption capacity of this prison does not exceed 5,021 inmates, the overcrowding percentage is over 25%. The report also indicated that overcrowding sometimes reaches up to 150%, based on the figures presented by the Prisons and Rehabilitation Authority.
The shortage of beds for prisoners in addition to the small size of prison wards leads the prison authority to mix the prison inmates with each other in one dormitory, regardless of the type of crime in which they were involved. In February this year, Head of Prisons and Rehabilitation Officers Syndicate Elfat Ayari raised a very controversial issue. She said that the prison authority decided to allow the detainees in terrorist cases to mix with the general prison population and that the adopted decision caused the other prison inmates to embrace extremist ideologies.
One day after that declaration, the banned Ansar al-Sharia terrorist organization released a statement in which it said Mornaguia prison is a good place and that it is adequate for attracting ordinary prisoners, washing their brain and presenting to them an image of religion as envisaged by the group.
There is no doubt that mixing general population prisoners with prisoners implicated in terrorist cases transcends the jurisdictions of prison institutions.
In addition to the problem of overcrowding, the absence of a clear vision about confronting religious extremism in prisons propels the recruitment. Keeping prisoners involved in terrorist cases in isolation is likely to make less radical groups even more radical while placing them in different dormitories with ordinary prisoners gives rise to a more complicated problem.
Prison-sanctioned prosyletizing
In the wake of the Tunisian uprising, many prisons were controlled by religious groups that promoted religion among the prison inmates. That tendency characterized several radical religious societies, which thrived in the early years of the revolution. Official authorities at that time found this to be a positive trend and did not object to allowing extremist religious leaders to enter and preach in Tunisia’s major prisons.
“Between 2012 and 2013, prisons went through their worst times of infiltration by extremist groups,” said Habib Rashidi, former Head of Prisons and Rehabilitation.
At that time, extremist preachers like Adel Alami (a vegetable vendor turned radical Salafist) and the Salafist sheikh el-Bashir bin Hussein were allowed to preach inside these prisons. Their preaching was transmitted through closed-circuit broadcasting all over the prison and inmates were compelled to listen to them. Alami used to incite inmates to go fight jihad in Syria and the necessity of applying Sharia, even by force.
The Mornaguia prison authority at the time blessed such narratives through a special recommendation by the Minister of Justice, to the extent that the ministry allowed pro-jihad leaflets to be distributed to the prisoners – all which has been documented and archived. Even delinquent children rehabilitation centers were targeted by those radical groups.”
Since then, in the last two years, prisons have turned into a haven for radical religious societies, under the pretext of fighting unethical behavior through religious education. In fact, fighting ethical aberration has led to a more dangerous religious perversion.
The Ministry of Justice has done nothing to stop the new trend by the prison authorities. On the contrary, political decision makers have openly praised and blessed that action.
What is even more dangerous is that the Ministry of Justice did not hesitate to conclude on December 6, 2012 an agreement with the Ministry of Religious Affairs run by Imam Nourudin Khadimi about preaching in prisons. Under that agreement, many religious leaders and societies embarked on implementing Islamic programs inside the prisons.
That agreement which was signed on behalf of the Ministry of Justice by the Islamist leader Nourudin Buhayri and the Minister of Religious Affairs Nourudin Khadimi provided for a large number of religious preaching procedures inside prisons including “planning lessons on creeds, jurisprudence, prophet’s traditions and biography.” It also provided for “teaching recitation and memorization of the Koran inside prisons,” as well as “performing Friday prayers, feasts prayers and collective prayers inside some prison wards.”
Nourudin Khadimi, who is known for his call to Jihad in Syria, quit the Ministry of Justice and was removed from his post as Imam of al-Fateh Mosque in the capital in mid-2015 following his inclusion in the list of extremist imams after the coming to power of Nida Tunis (Call for Tunisia) party.
Many religious societies or organizations concerned with defending Islamist prisoners such as Insan Foundation, Freedom and Justice Society, Justice and Rehabilitation and Bariq Foundation have taken advantage of the agreement on paying regular visits to prisons.
More significantly, major prisons, particularly Mornaguia prison, turned into something like an operation room for extremist groups due to dissolving the guidance and spying system inside prisons since the revolution.
Rashidi said when the then Minister of Justice Nourudin Buhayri was in the troika government, “communication jamming equipment was dismantled. At that time, 20 to 30 mobile phones entered the prison every day during family visits or were smuggled into the cells by some prison officers in the context of a flourishing trade.”
“We later discovered through statements made by some prisoners who were detained on terrorist charges that there were contacts made between terrorist leaderships held in the Boushousha detention center and a number of Uqba bin Nafe battalion elements stationed in the Chambi Mountains,” he said.
According to prison authorities, thousands of prisoners were recruited and forced to join extremist groups. Hundreds of them later joined the militants in the battlefields in Iraq, Syria and Libya.
The figures released by the interior ministry provided that between 3,000 and 3,500 Tunisians were dispatched to other countries for ‘jihad’. Most of these Tunisians were ideologically mobilized while they spent their terms in prisons.
Kamal Zarouk who became a preacher at the Syrian town of Tell Abyad before it was recaptured by the Kurdish People Protection forces in mid-2015 is perhaps one of the most prominent jihadi Tunisian in Syria. During his imprisonment at Mornaguia prison, he was nicknamed Shqaif and was one of the most notorious criminals prior to embracing the extremist religious thoughts.
Halting the recruitment chain
What can be done to tackle the recruitment phenomenon inside the Tunisian prisons?
The official Tunisian authorities have in fact presented a vague answer for solving this problem. Ridha Zaghdoud, Spokesperson of Prisons and Rehabilitation Authority, denied the existence of the so-called ‘terrorism contagion’ inside prisons.
“We take all possible strict measures to prevent the spread of terrorist thoughts in prisons including classification of prisoners into four categories based on sex, age, type of offense and the punitive action and whether the prisoner has been convicted or detained,” he said.
“We also take into consideration the risk factor and we have a database for these prisoners according to the risk level involved. In addition, to reduce the negative impact of the prisoners held for suspected terrorist accusations and ordinary prisoners, we practically separate prisoners as much as we can,” he said.
Speaking about polarization inside the prisons, Zaghdoud explained, “We cannot confirm any such polarizations until after the departure of prisoners and their perpetration of terror acts. Given the significant number of prisoners accused of being involved in terrorist cases, we stress the strict legal action taken against all prisoners. Besides, we have tackled the problem of communication from and to the prison by installing mobile phone transmission jamming device in all prison wards.”
The prison authority officer also stressed the significant role played by the poor conditions and limited accommodation capacity of prisons in the spread of prisoners’ recruitment phenomenon. “We should indicate in this connection that the classification procedure reduces the polarization process although overcrowding negatively reflects on the ideal effect of the adopted classification,” he said.
The official representative underlined that among the protection mechanisms adopted by the prison authorities is the awareness and religious guidance program. The program is a plan shared by the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Religious Affairs. It reached the final drafting stage and is expected to come into force in the near future. It will allow approved preachers to enter prisons and attempt to do away with all extremist and Takfirist notions from the minds of prisoners.
