The atmosphere of the referendum on Egypt’s new Constitution reveals that the political conflict in Egypt is made up of two main forces—the army and the Islamists. This is nothing new here yet Egyptians must learn how to go beyond these two confines in order to achieve true democracy.

To reach a solution, we must identify and analyze three major issues that contribute to this: the low level of political culture in the community, awareness of the nature of the army as well as its role and the ancient religious ideology of the Islamists.

The atmosphere of the referendum on Egypt’s new Constitution reveals that the political conflict in Egypt is made up of two main forces—the army and the Islamists. This is nothing new here yet Egyptians must learn how to go beyond these two confines in order to achieve true democracy.

To reach a solution, we must identify and analyze three major issues that contribute to this: the low level of political culture in the community, awareness of the nature of the army as well as its role and the ancient religious ideology of the Islamists.

The low level of political culture

The military rule in Egypt that has been in place since 1952 has weakened the community’s political culture due to many reasons including its pro military regime speech that dominated the state-owned media, beneficiary elite, clerics loyal to it, repression in the name of security and neglect of social development, which has weakened the educated middle class.

The years prior to the January 25, 2011 revolution witnessed a remarkable rise in the level of the political culture in Egypt, especially with the access to Internet, the emergence of social networks, establishment of independent newspapers and satellite television channels, presence of human rights organizations and political movements. However, the development was limited to a small percentage of people, the most of whom were young individuals yearning for a change and a better future.

The political culture level rose somewhat during and after the 2011 revolution. More people became interested in their rights and began to call for a civil rule and a good Constitution, but the ruling powers – whether Army or Islamists, allied or conflicting–took advantage of the shallow culture among large segments of people and tried to consolidate their powers.

In addition, numerous political parties and organizations on the scene do not practice internal democracy and tend to employ authoritarian speech. The political culture of a community can be measured through two criteria:  (1) the degree of people’s respect and adherence to the role of institutions and civil government and (2) the extent to entrench civil institutions like political parties, trade unions, federations and associations. Both criteria are witnessing a clear decline.

The army’s role

The military institution, it should be noted, historically tends to interfere in political affairs. It plays the role of direct rule but influences political decisions from behind the scenes like all other countries’ military institutions. This is not the case in Turkey, for example, where the military’s role does not supersede the political culture.

The January 25 revolution clearly showed the military’s tendency to playing a strong role. After taking the reins of power from former President Hosni Mubarak, the military retained power for a year and a half under political and popular pressure.

The most prominent indicator that emerged during that phase was the behavior of Marshal Hussein Tantawi, the Council’s former Chairman, when he took to city center streets to greet and shake the hands of demonstrators and passers-by wearing civilian clothes.

Reading between the lines, activists and politicians practiced continued pressure to transfer power to civilians until holding presidential elections, which resulted in the victory of one of the Islamists’ symbols— Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohamed Morsi. Thus, the military handed over the power to the Muslim Brotherhood while other Islamic political currents controlled the majority of seats in the Parliament and Shura Council.

After mass demonstrations on June 30, armed forces isolated Morsi. A temporary civilian government took power, but the military’s impact on political decisions was clear. The return of military rule is still looming, with the possibility to nominate General Abdel Fattah Sisi, Minister of Defense, for the presidency.

Islamist ideology

The main structure of the different Islamic political currents ideology is based, to a large extent, on Salafist curricula that study the interpretations of scholars and imams who lived during the first 400 years of Islam, i.e. about 1000 years ago. That is why the Islamists are detached intellectually from reality.

The intellectual revisions and plans of reform they declared when they handed over the power are but a weak crust that envelops a huge building of Salafist religious convictions as they have two main problematic points: (1) affiliation to the organization overrides patriotism and (2) the existence of a regime that raises the banner of religious rule over the state opens the door to extremism and violence.

Changing history

It is hard to come up with solutions to such a dilemma in few lines, but here are some ideas.

First, people are what matter most. The decisive element is the level of political culture in the community, so there is a need to focus on upgrading it through education, independent media and the Internet. There is also a need to build and strengthen influential civil institutions (political parties, trade unions, federations and associations) that create a balance of power between civilians and militaries.

Second, the military is an important element in the components of the state. The problem lies in the vision of its leaders. The vision is determined by the extent of professionalism in the organization and by knowing that it has been established to carry out specific tasks such as state policy. They are definitely not a group of savior knights on white horses.

Third, the presence of a religious current is normal in any society. The problem lies in the ideology of this current, which needs to be dealt with from its foundation—they wear pious uniforms and speak about mercy while actually practicing violence.

Fourth, military dictatorship and religious theocracy sometimes fight each other, but they can ally and complete each other and even unite at other times. Therefore, the visions of the military and Islamists should run parallel. The presence of a professional army under an authority of an old religious reference is a disaster, especially to a state that is pivotal in its region.

Finally, security and stability are important in achieving these revisions as a first step in building a new Egypt. Repression and suppression of freedoms will lead to temporary results, especially in a country suffering from great economic crises, whose citizens were emboldened by the revolution and country’s youth that do not accept the choice between bad and worse.