The assassination of nationalist Mohamed Brahmi, a member of the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) and leader of the secularist Popular Front Party has not passed without reactions and repercussions, especially since it occurred during national circumstances characterized by social and political tension.

The assassination of nationalist Mohamed Brahmi, a member of the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) and leader of the secularist Popular Front Party has not passed without reactions and repercussions, especially since it occurred during national circumstances characterized by social and political tension.

The assassination coincided with increased calls for ousting the government, coupled with calls for rebellion and demoralization of the current path controlled by the Ennahda Movement, causing many people concerned with public affairs to lose patience and start talking about the need to change the regime.

The Interior Minister Lotfi Ben Jeddou revealed that Brahmi’s assassins themselves had assassinated leftist leader Chokri Belaid, using the same weapon and the same plan.

Brahmi’s killing did not occur in the context of settling of scores, neither was it an ordinary crime that went off unnoticed. It was, rather a deliberate and carefully planned operation, especially in terms of timing and selection of a suitable target; one that would cause the required shock and consequences.

Away from political or personal accusations, or even attempts to blame the killing on this party or that party, identifying its most important goals requires getting familiar with the major circumstances surrounding it, which are as follows:

–      The political situation that reached a choking point where dialogue between the government and the opposition was virtually non-existent, except in rare cases where some secretary generals would meet only to emerge with very little, if any, results;

–      The social situation which greatly aggravated in light of threats by Tamarod (rebellion) groups to take to streets and topple the government, and the convulsive statements and reactions made by the ruling authority, especially Ennahda leaders, to the point of threatening of murdering all those who challenge legitimacy, as stated by Sahbi Atigue, head of Ennahda parliamentary bloc; and

–      The Arab and international situation marked by accelerating events both at the level of the Arab Spring countries, which are similar to Tunisia in terms of political and popular details and consequent ousting of Ennahda’s big brother, or at the level of the Gulf states that support and sponsor this Spring in terms of reversing the existing situation there and emergence of a Saudi-Emirati party which appears to have taken charge of the files of the Arab Spring as well as of the Middle East in general, thus replacing the Qatari player which has slumbered in recent weeks, and from which all the files relating to the future of the region have been withdrawn.

This data must be taken into account when extrapolating the facts of the incident in which fingers have automatically pointed to Ennahda, whether directly accusing it of the murder, or blaming it for failure to protect the country, the citizens, and the prominent figures.

Many Ennahda leaders have said on several occasions that Ennahda is the prime loser in this incident, and assured that it would be a political suicide for the movement to perpetrate an assassination of this size, at this particular time, and under these objective circumstances.

While security official’s investigation has focused on internal parties, especially the Takfiri Salafist groups, automatically linking this assassination to that of Belaid, several indicators must also be taken into consideration and included in the possible incitements or motives, even if they are external or have occurred in the form of media statements, or statements made by Arab and foreign politicians. Some of the obvious motives are:

–      The Egyptian scenario which many parties at home and abroad seek to reproduce in Tunisia.  Given the absence of the most important element in it; namely, the military, an assassination of this size could be sufficient in compensating for the role of the army, and causing public, regional and even tribal anger to replace the generals and accelerate the process of ousting the regime;

–      Statements made by Ennahda leaders, primarily its leader Rashid al-Ghannoushi as well as Laarayedh, Atigue, and others, that the movement would confront whoever tried to challenge legitimacy, by all possible and affordable means, including blood shedding , as Atigue said;

–      Media reports released in mid-July, which spoke about Ennahda’s weapon stocking up and training fighters ahead of a repeat of the Egyptian scene;

–      Reports published by the Algerian media last week, which warned against infiltration of fighters and weapons from Libya to Tunisia in preparation of carrying out operations in Tunisia and Algeria; and

–      The statement made two weeks ago by Dubai Security Chief Dahi Khalfan in which he said Ennahda would not last in power more than eighteen months at most.

The timing of these reports and statements, though by different parties that are geographically distant from Tunisia, might have a link with Brahmi’s assassination if viewed from an international angle away from the internal calculations the Tunisian authorities are clinging to.

No matter how different the analyses and readings are and regardless of available facts and data, an assassination of this magnitude and at this particular time must have goals that transcend the killing of an opposition figure and are more serious than liquidating a national icon or an NCA member. The assassination will undoubtedly have serious and acute repercussions on the country, especially at this point in time which seems to be open to more tension and to a fresh cycle of violence that might have been triggered by the killing of Brahmi, and whose end is still known to no one.