The results of the General National Congress (GNC) elections in Libya were obviously unexpected compared to those in neighboring Tunisia and Egypt where Islamists came to power. In Libya, civil movements, represented by National Forces Alliance, as a unified political entity won the majority of the GNC seats.

Represented in both present and former governments by quite significant, though greatly different numbers of ministerial portfolios, the political entities affiliated with political Islam have not managed to secure power.

The results of the General National Congress (GNC) elections in Libya were obviously unexpected compared to those in neighboring Tunisia and Egypt where Islamists came to power. In Libya, civil movements, represented by National Forces Alliance, as a unified political entity won the majority of the GNC seats.

Represented in both present and former governments by quite significant, though greatly different numbers of ministerial portfolios, the political entities affiliated with political Islam have not managed to secure power.

Many questions have been raised about the failure of Islamic parties, which launched huge electoral campaigns and were expected to win.  For example, like ‘Homeland Party’ which won no seats even though observers described its campaign as the largest. There are many questions too about the nature of these parties’ relationships with countries that support their political trends, such as Qatar, and the problems and internal conflicts they incite.

Libyan journalist, writer and Muslim Brother Ismail Gritli was head of Homeland Party’s election campaign in the GNC elections in July 2012:

 

Mr. Gritli, the Homeland Party, of which you were a co-founder, did not achieve the success you had anticipated. How do you explain that failure?

 

We did not plan to contest the elections at this stage, but in conformity with a decision by the party’s bureaus, committed by its preparatory committee, we embarked on the elections campaigning. I personally predicted failure, simply because the party was not prepared to contest the elections, and lacked grassroots. It was in the process of establishing a new trend of political action in Libya.

 

The mobilized resources were not large but were utilized in a proper and planned manner, which caused the campaign to look as though it had used significant resources.

 

Before and after the elections, the party was described by the street and social networks as being affiliated with Qatar. Why do you think that description linked to your party?

 

That was a propaganda fabricated by Islamic trend’s opponents. No one could come up with a single piece of evidence to confirm that claim, not even the man I had a televised debate with.

 

What is your assessment of the role played by Qatar during the liberation war, and the present transitional stage? Does Qatar have a distinctive relationship with Libya, in comparison to other nations?

 

Like other countries, Qatar played an effective role in supporting Libya. I lived in Qatar for over a decade; however, I do not know what others specifically mean when they talk about its role. All that is said is just talk that lacks verifiable evidence.

 

Some believe that the transition from the revolution to the state stage is stumbling, while others believe that things are moving forward. What is your assessment of the stage reached so far?

 

Looking at Libyan society from the perspective of sociology and social theories, the Libyans have not yet satisfied the requirements of modern urban society, considering that they are still dependent on regional and tribal affiliations in their day-to-day relationships, rather than on the logic of business interests.

 

Objectively speaking, this means that Libya needs to build awareness of society and social relations, and to establish a culture geared toward promoting the social concept and deepening individuals’ association with society before reaching a well-established modern society on which the state is founded.

 

Therefore, what we see in Libya is keeping pace and complying with a state model, although our awareness of its existence is still incomplete. Its basic component; namely, society, with all its methodical requirements, has not been achieved.

 

Political blocs and parties within GNC are involved in political conflicts and debates described as being carried out at the nation’s expense. This poses the question of whether GNC is a consensual or political entity. Has it been too early to get into party rivalries at a stage in which we need to close our ranks?

 

We have rushed in everything because of the ongoing pressures. It is impossible to stop the wheel of time or take the Libyans out of the context of their daily life to consolidate their awareness, build their society and then embark upon building the state.

 

Rushing creates undesirable effects of building an immature entity that may take us back to a primitive state of tyranny and unilateralism. There has to be an awareness of the stages of establishment that take into consideration proper upbringing of young generations conducive to building the aspired society and paving the ground for the state.

 

I cannot tell if we are able to maintain a fragile consensus governed neither by rules nor controlled by a collective awareness vis-à-vis the nature of the founding stage in Libya.

 

The Brotherhood is accused of fearing social movement, antagonizing salvation gatherings taking place in Benghazi on Fridays, and desperately defending the armed battalions on the pretext of non- marginalization of the revolutionaries. How true is this?

I am not a spokesman for the Brotherhood, but I may say these repeated charges, in addition to all information and rumors circulated in Libya are ill-founded. I can personally assure you that the Brotherhood in Libya does not have any military wing.

 

Besides, their talk about the revolutionaries is based on their awareness of the role played by the rebels in the revolution and on the fact that it is social dialogue that solves problems, deepens individuals’ understanding of the state, and paves the ground for achieving cultural and social stability, which must precede political and legal stability.

“Libya shield is a Brotherhood’s product, and the Chief of Staff, Major General Yousef Mangoush, is protected by it,” are expressions we have been hearing in the street on a daily basis, especially on the eve of Galaa Hospital blast. Why does this talk target the Brotherhood?

 

There is no organizational or ideological connection between the Brotherhood and all the armed formations existent on the ground. Consequently, the establishment of the shields was a concept initiated and enacted by the state.

 

The Brotherhood only knew Mangoush during the revolution, just as they did other army officers and rebels. The Brotherhood has provided protection neither to him nor to anyone else.

 

As to why this talk is only targeting the Brotherhood, you can ask those who have been saying it since the early days of the revolution. I personally believe that this occurs in the context of rivalry by political adversaries who depend on the former regime’s terms, concepts and ideas, especially because many of those who chant these words were officially associated for many decades with the former regime, whether in its political, social or security form.

 

What do you think of the calls for developing Dar al-Ifta so that Fatawa are issued by a Fatwa Council rather than by the Grand Mufti? And, where does the boundary between Dar al-Ifta and politics lie?

 

The accurate information I have is that Dar al-Ifta adopts the policy of collective jihad, and that the Grand Mufti never pronounces a fatwa individually. For specialized matters, he is bound to sit down with specialists along with the Fatwa Council members for long hours to understand the details of the issues in question.

 

Dar al-Ifta is an official authority entrusted with several duties, including explaining the legal opinion towards a state action and supporting maintenance of social order of the Libyan society, which is founded on Islam’s tenets and values.

 

What do you think of the political isolation coordination committee’s role in the political landscape and in the enforcement of the isolation law?

 

I believe it is a lobby group, like other pressure groups in Libya. This model is customary in democratic norms. It obviously managed to establish awareness among the people and the elite about the importance of political isolation in revolutions, which undoubtedly  formed a lobbying force against the GNC, expediting the discussion of the law, which was consistent with the tendency of large social elites and segments.

 

I certainly deny what some people are circulating about the GNC having passed the law under duress because, until now, these people could not prove this claim, especially since figures outside the supporters of the law have recognized it, including persons affected by it, like the GNC Deputy President, Giuma Atigha.

 Do you support the federal movement in Cyrenaica?

 The talk about the form of the state and its political and administrative system is normal in Libya given that we are going through a constitutional stage. After all these discussions, dialogues, and building pressure groups in favor of any form, the final opinion will be given by the people through a referendum.

All attempts to impose de facto situations are not acceptable because they allow anyone with a vision, opinion or political agenda to use that approach. This will undoubtedly lead the country to an obscure present and unknown future.