Finally, the caesarean birth of the Independent High Authority for Audiovisual Communication (HAICA) was announced in Tunisia on World Press Freedom Day (May 3, 2013) after a long tug of war between the government on one side and journalists and civil society organizations on the other. HAICA must establish its role as an amending authority tasked with framing the audiovisual sector.

Finally, the caesarean birth of the Independent High Authority for Audiovisual Communication (HAICA) was announced in Tunisia on World Press Freedom Day (May 3, 2013) after a long tug of war between the government on one side and journalists and civil society organizations on the other. HAICA must establish its role as an amending authority tasked with framing the audiovisual sector.

Interim President Moncef Marzouki announced the HAICA composition headed by Nouri Lajmi, a university teacher at the Institute of Press and Information Sciences in Tunis, with eight members: two representatives of the National Constituent Assembly, and one representative of each of the National Syndicates of Tunisian Journalists (NSTJ), Media Owner Association (MOA), and Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT), in addition to two judges. But the Judges Association soon challenged the legality of one of the judges and threatened of complaining to the Administrative Court.

The announcement of the HAICA’s composition, which included some controversial names, came after long challenges that continued a year and a half as of the issuance of the Audiovisual Communication Decree No. 116 dated November 2, 2011.

Tackling chaos

Having effectively contributed to the formulation of this decree, NSTJ was the most clinging to expediting its enforcement in order to put an end to the chaos experienced by the sector, rationalize media performance and ensure respect for the rights of journalists.

However, the activation process was disabled by the powerful and influential MOA because of the confusions they found in the mentioned decree, especially since they had been arbitrarily excluded from drafting it. And it remained disabled until the new government, led by Ennahda Movement and its two small partners, Ettakatol and Conference for the Republic (CPR), came to power.

The new rulers’ determination to invest the victory they achieved in the October 23^th 2011 elections to obtain decision-making positions at the media level, only deepened the crisis, especially since disabling the decree enforcement was to the benefit of them and of MOA.

Senior officials of Ennahda, notably its leader Rashid Ghannouchi, threatened the sale of public media institutions because they insisted on professionally dealing with them and did not allow them to have, at the media level, a favored position similar to what they achieved through the elections.

In the face of the sector mobilization to thwart the quota principle the troika wanted to apply in the media as they did politically, the sector witnessed a new form of targeting, the use of militias to attack and intimidate journalists.

This culminated in a sit-in staged by militias known as the Revolution Protection Leagues in front of the Public Television Institution for 54 days to demand changing the independent editorial line of this institution and subjecting it to the vision of the “legitimate majority elected by the people.” After the fall of the militia card, they resorted to exploiting the imposed vacuity in order to control the media.

Programmed vacuity

Decree 116 stipulates that HAICA shall grant license of radio and television channels in the framework of transparency and equality and under a standard book of conditions. It also provides for making binding suggestions to the government about the appointments of top positions of public radio and TV stations, while the government may not review these suggestions which shall be based on professional competence and independence.

However, the government has exploited the delay of HAICA establishment to appoint top positions, which has sparked a controversy on the dependency of the appointees and their association with the Ennahda political agendas.

Faced with this situation and having used all ways of dialogue and communication with the government on the HAICA establishment but to no avail, NSTJ staged a successful strike on October 17, 2012 to demand in particular the activation of Decree 116 and announcement of the HAICA composition in order to start its work.

This only required that the interim president assume his legal responsibility and implement Article 47 of Decree 116, which states: “Temporarily and pending the establishment of legislative and executive institutions based on the new constitution, and in coordination with the National Authority for the Reform of Information and Communication, the interim president  shall appoint the HAICA chairman and members from independent personalities known for their expertise and competence in the field.” However, the president gave up this power for the benefit of a tripartite committee from the ruling troika parties.

Political conflicts, control attempts and party dominance led to disabling HAICA’s announcement, despite an agreement between the professional parties – MOA, NSTJ and the UGTT General Syndicate of Culture and Information – and the presidency.

The president did not commit to announcing the HAICA on December 10, 2012 – the International Day of Human Rights – and his advisers continued to profess that the announcement would be made in the following hours, but this did not happen.

The situation continued unchanged due to a lack of political will and the existent vacuity was exploited to chaotically create new radio and television channels of unknown sources of funding, though of clear directions and goals.

Afterbirth

After the HAICA composition was announced, the group will have to begin building from scratch; it will have to determine its work objectives according to the decree, identify the HAICA structural construction and determine the terms of reference of its various departments and due assignments. Then comes training and qualifying of the new employees.

While it is not difficult to find a headquarter, finding the necessary funding may face obstacles because the 2013 state budget has allocated no funding to establish the HAICA, which would disrupt the progress of the operation even in the presence of a political will committed to its success.

Spokesman for the Presidency and Director of the Presidential Office Adnan Mansar said his party, CPR, compiled a dossier to be submitted to HAICA before the election on violations made against it. This raises the question of whether HAICA will protect freedom as stipulated in its establishment decree or be a tool for political reckoning.

Will HAICA be ready before the next election, which seems imminent, even within the lower limits ensuring a minimum level of balance between the various political parties during the election campaign? Will its members comply with the past agreements about the non-enforcement of the Decree 116 articles that threatens freedom of the media?

The situation is certainly complex, but not impossible. In spite of all circumstances witnessed by Tunisia, the media has remained disobedient to all attempts of taming and control.