Even before Egyptians went to polling stations to cast their votes on the new constitution, the following facts were clear: the constitution was drafted by an assembly that is neither politically nor socially balanced; the constitution’s articles were approved by a poll conducted by the members of a single political party; the required percentage of public approval through the referendum is only 50 percent plus one; and the referendum does not determine the minimum turnout of those who are entitled to vote.

Even before Egyptians went to polling stations to cast their votes on the new constitution, the following facts were clear: the constitution was drafted by an assembly that is neither politically nor socially balanced; the constitution’s articles were approved by a poll conducted by the members of a single political party; the required percentage of public approval through the referendum is only 50 percent plus one; and the referendum does not determine the minimum turnout of those who are entitled to vote.

These facts can mean only the following: it is the Muslim Brotherhood that drafted the constitution; voted for its articles and mobilized its own proponents to vote ‘yes’ for the constitution. Thus, the “Brotherhood constitution” as deemed by the Egyptian press has been aptly named.

Despite all previous facts, the results of the first phase of the referendum (56% ‘yea’ to 44% ‘nay’) were shocking to the Brotherhood as reflected in their media and the reactions of their leaders. Silence has reigned in the Brotherhood premises instead of the usual celebrations upon winning an election campaign.

Confident promises preceding the referendum, for example, that the people would approve the constitution by more than 70% “for the purpose of stability” and “to challenge the remnants”, have been broken. Instead, the Brotherhood’s politicians and media professionals quoted foreign referendum results where voters approved the constitution by minor percentages. However, it quickly rebounded on the Brotherhood since experts discovered that the quoted models were for referendums that had been publicly overthrown or completely forged.

A question of crediblity

The minor difference between “yes” and “no” at the first phase results contributed to the credibility of the opposition, which demanded first of all to cease the referendum and then asked the people to boycott it before finally deciding to mobilize them against the constitution after it found out that the Brotherhood was on its way to endorse it.

The minor difference between results and the low turnout (30%) also contributed to supporting the accusations of fraud, violations and deliberate disruption of polling stations of the opposition, especially in the absence of full judicial supervision after ‘Egypt Judges Club’; most prosecutors boycotted the supervision over the referendum in addition to the Brotherhood proponents’ blockade of the Supreme Constitutional Court.

The results confirmed the opposition’s stand that the constitution is not consensual and does not reflect the Egyptians inclination, since the results came as approximately equal, meaning that the proposed constitution does not realize the primary purpose of any constitution which is public consensus.

Another blow was received by the Brotherhood when they lost in Cairo by 14 points (57% “no” to 43% “yes”), which means that the Brotherhood will face a tough time in Cairo, the government stronghold; the largest city in the Middle East; and the center of politics, media and judiciary. It also means that the sit-ins at Heliopolis Palace will continue.

Moreover, they have lost in Gharbia Governorate in the city of Mahalla, which had the central role in the revolution. Furthermore, the close results in the rest of the Delta cities, the historical stronghold of the Brotherhood, left no choice for the Brotherhood but to achieve winning in Upper Egypt, the poorest area, which suffers from marginalization, illiteracy, sectarian conflicts and widespread militant groups. This has contributed to setting the Brotherhood’s loss on two levels: ‘geographical,’ since its popularity has decreased in its strongholds at the rural Delta, and ‘class’ by losing their influence on the middle class.

Observers have noticed that the opposition’s demonstrations, especially at Heliopolis Palace, almost represent a definition for the term “urban middle class,” which have for the first time perceived a true threat to its lifestyle, which is expressed by others as “the war of countryside against city.” Some have tried to give this conflict a Marxist dimension through which the Brotherhood would seem as a representative of the poor against the bourgeoisie.

However, this dimension ignores two basic issues; it rules out the predominance of identic attribute of the conflict and overlooks the obvious fact that the Brotherhood does not represent the poor but exploits them for the benefit of its own Bourgeoisie that embraces the most extreme economic neoliberal levels to the extent of suspending government subsidy and increasing taxes on goods in a way and speed that Mubarak’s regime itself dared not do.

In general, and according to a simple calculation of the first phase results, the “Brotherhood’s constitution” will not be passed by a great majority unless the Brotherhood achieves an immense victory that approaches the hundred percent at the second phase, which seems impossible unless with enormous forgery. This means that the “stability” sought by the Brotherhood will not be fulfilled any time soon and is an extra failure to be added to the already undesired President Morsi.