Last Saturday’s political meeting – called a “national dialogue” – had the most in common with similar meetings previously arranged by Safwat el-Sherif, the former secretary-general of ousted president Hosni Mubarak’s now-defunct National Democratic Party (NDP). Or maybe the meetings that another former leader in Mubarak’s government, Omar Suleiman, held during the Egyptian revolution in January 2011. Basically these meetings were just debates between the authorities and their own auxiliaries.

Last Saturday’s political meeting – called a “national dialogue” – had the most in common with similar meetings previously arranged by Safwat el-Sherif, the former secretary-general of ousted president Hosni Mubarak’s now-defunct National Democratic Party (NDP). Or maybe the meetings that another former leader in Mubarak’s government, Omar Suleiman, held during the Egyptian revolution in January 2011. Basically these meetings were just debates between the authorities and their own auxiliaries.

Historically Egypt’s ruling party would always create cartoon political parties just to give the Egyptian public the impression that they were in conversation with some kind of opposition.  Egypt’s current leader, President Mohammed Morsi, is doing the same thing, establishing Islamic parties, most of which are related somehow to his own party, the Muslim Brotherhood.

He’s describing his advisers and colleagues – people like moderate Islamist academic, Mohammed Salim al-Awa, Egyptian academic, Ahmed Kamal Abul Magd, and former lawyer Ayman Nour – the “opposition” and he’s talking about how he’s had discussions with them. He’s also boasting of talking to members of the Egyptian Constituent Assembly – even though this was, in fact, created by his own party.

Meanwhile every other politician of influence was absent from this “national dialogue”. This is what has roused Egyptian people to go to the streets to oppose Morsi’s declarations. They believe that these were drafted without input from any other community groups and that the authority has been conducting a monologue.

In truth, the “national dialogue” was not supposed to solve the current crisis. Rather it was meant to create an impression on the public, to persuade the non-politicized masses that the crisis was over and that President Morsi had given way for the sake of Egypt, and that the Egyptian people have had the final say.

However it was a poorly judged strategy. Firstly because many Egyptians have become very politicized, they are no longer so easily fooled by such verbal manipulation or political manoeuvring. Secondly because a lot of people already believe that the President has lost his legitimacy, particularly because some demonstrators were killed by his own party’s militias. And thirdly, because those who are protesting won’t accept a little modification here or there: they want to totally overthrow Morsi’s newly minted government.

The reaction in Cairo’s streets is not directed by any one movement or political faction, this is a spontaneous expression of outrage.

The Egyptian people have once again taken to the streets to finish their unfinished revolution. Decisions made behind closed doors are unlikely to calm them. Rather, they will only provoke them further. Demonstrators are raging against not only President Morsi, but also his party, the Muslim Brotherhood which seems to be trying to establish hegemony again. They fear a totalitarian government, such as those which exist in lands not too far away – like Iran, for example. 

In order to understand the outcome of the so-called “national dialogue” we need to place it in the context of three other events that also occurred on the weekend.

There was the press conference held by the Muslim Brotherhood’s supreme guide in Egypt, Mohammed Badie. The supreme guide said that the Brotherhood would not abandon its current position and would, in fact, defend it – which implies a threat to opposition parties.

Secondly the comments to media made by the Brotherhood’s deputy supreme guide, Khairat el-Shater, which tried to garner support from the more extreme Islamic party, the Salafists. Basically el-Shater characterized the current conflict as a war against Islam, with the protestor’s campaign only created to show the shortcomings of Islamic rule. He added a sectarian dimension to his speech, by mentioning the Coptic Christians, who greatly antagonize the Salafists, and he claimed that external anti-Islamic influences were also behind the protests.

El-Shater even tried to play on the emotions of the Egyptian middle class, who comprise most of the anti-Morsi demonstrators, by claiming that stability would be better for attracting international investment. But what he doesn’t realize is that the Egyptian middle class are protesting because the Muslim Brotherhood’s rule jeopardizes their culture and their lifestyle.

What the statements by the supreme guide and his deputy had in common was something that Morsi also mentioned in his speech – and that is the non-negotiable nature of the national poll on the draft constitution, which has been criticized for enshrining the rights of Muslims but ignoring most others in a more secular Egypt. It should take place this coming weekend.

Word from inside the Brotherhood’s ranks suggest that this is important – the current constitution represents the least of the deals the Muslim Brotherhood could do with the Salafists in exchange for their support – these deals are the very minimum the latter would accept. It will not be possible to change those articles of the constitution.

Then finally, the third thing to consider is the statement made by Egypt’s armed forces. First the army said it would host further reconciliation talks between Morsi and his opposition, then it turned around and postponed those talks. That could be interpreted in a number of ways but one thing is clear: the army has not yet returned to their barracks and the Egyptian military still considers itself a political power player.

Right now, the only thing that recent attempts at national dialogue have done is to put revolutionaries’ backs against the wall. They see that now Egypt only has two choices: absolute fascism or absolute democracy. Neither will be easy to achieve.