National Transition Council Chairman, Nati Mustafa Abdul Jalil, discusses how he handled the question of federalism in Libya, his moment of behaving like a dictator and sending away an unveiled woman meant to present him with his title; a look at the man behind the politician.
Are you satisfied with the way you addressed the federalism issue? Was not it better to call for national dialogue following the Barqa declaration?
Who said we did not call for dialogue? We did and we brought their leaders to al-Bayda and negotiated with them.
National Transition Council Chairman, Nati Mustafa Abdul Jalil, discusses how he handled the question of federalism in Libya, his moment of behaving like a dictator and sending away an unveiled woman meant to present him with his title; a look at the man behind the politician.
Are you satisfied with the way you addressed the federalism issue? Was not it better to call for national dialogue following the Barqa declaration?
Who said we did not call for dialogue? We did and we brought their leaders to al-Bayda and negotiated with them.
But dialogue was not your first reaction?
The federalists’ early approach was clearly separatist; everyone was aware of this. It was not political or patriotic. They established an army and a council for Barqa and this was secession.
The approach was wrong and would have led to disorder but the Libyans chose the homeland and left them alone. The project kept fading until it disappeared.
What happened when al-Zubair al-Senussi, head of the Barqa Council, visited you after your surgery?
He visited me in the hospital and then again at the house of a friend. He came with his band, who kept pushing him to make statements. Amongst them was Abdulhamid Jibril, al-Nimr, Abdul Jawad al-Badin and Fadl al-Shuheibi. Senussi did not talk that much.
We tried to reach an agreement about the elections and, thank God, these succeeded. We agreed on a kind of truce and I thanked them for their compliance during the election day.
The situation before the elections was critical, but when we told them failure would mean Chapter VII and tutelage, they chose the homeland.
People say this truce was a political deal between the NTC and the federalists, in return for amending Article 30 of the constitutional declaration so that the members of the Constitution Committee would be elected through the ballots and not by the NTC members?
It was not a deal. During the discussions, they raised demands and we told them some were possible and some were not. For the good of the country, we amended Article 30 and it was one of their demands.
Was the amendment made to make the federalists withdraw from al-Wadi al-Ahmar and oil ports?
Yes.
Dr. Fathi al-Baajeh, former Chairman of the NTC General Policy Committee told a TV channel that the Ikhwan (Bedouin) staged a coup against the NTC chairman. What is your response?
Fathi al-Baajeh is one of the first NTC combatants. He is entitled to say whatever he wants. The NTC resolutions have only been made by majority. The only decision, where I assume responsibility, because I pushed strongly to convince many people to pass it, was the amendment of Article 30 of the Constitutional Declaration. Otherwise, we have democracy and the Ikhwan did not have dominance. It is true they favoured some thoughts and themselves but they had no control on the decision making process.
I did force the amendment. It was the first time I behaved like a dictator. I told them it was for “the good of the homeland” and some NTC members became convinced and we amended the article.
How many NTC members were there in the amendment session?
Quorum was not fulfilled. There were 47 members and 32 of them agreed.
During the handover ceremony, you asked the presenter to leave the hall and replaced her with a male; was it a message you intended to communicate?
In Ramadan, I stayed at al-Bayda for two reasons. First, I was following up the challenges and was afraid that some court may cancel the vote regarding the parties. I know the eastern region and was aware of the audacity of its judges, especially after the verdict in Benghazi that the formation of the Electoral Commission was not legal. It was a painful blow by the Libyan judiciary, which remained dormant throughout the war, only to wake up all of a sudden and issue this verdict, but we redressed it lawfully.
The second reason was the rush of certain NTC members to assume certain jobs. For example, Ahmad al-Dayekh said that I had nominated some of them as ambassadors while the fact was that I received lists in this regard but did not decide on any.
Thus, I stayed in al-Bayda to avoid embarrassment by those NTC members who wanted to become ambassadors and CEOs and receive remunerations. That is why I was not able to stay in Tripoli to attend the preparations for the handover ceremony.
I kept in touch with the preparation team and the presenter was scheduled to be Tarek Buzqieh, but upon my arrival, I learned that they had replaced him with a woman. I asked that she should wear a hijab—headscarf— but in the ceremony I was surprised to see her unveiled. I asked her via the Deputy Chairman, Mustafa al-Houni, behind the stage, to wear a hijab but she declined and reappeared before the audience, the matter that aroused some boos among the NTC members, so I ordered her to stop and she was replaced.
It was not a matter of personal freedom at the time; it was the first event of its kind in Libya and it had to keep Islamic protocols. A woman may never present the ceremony and, to tell the truth, she was polite and complied.
Part four of this interview will appear next week on Correspondents.
