When Jihadi Salafists bullets were fired on December 2006 in a southern suburb of Tunis, an argument broke out between elites and political activists about the scope of this violent current and the reasons for its emergence in Tunisia. Living in London at the time, Rashid al-Ghannushi, leader of the Ennahda Movement, said that what emerged of Salafism was only “the tip of the iceberg.”    

When Jihadi Salafists bullets were fired on December 2006 in a southern suburb of Tunis, an argument broke out between elites and political activists about the scope of this violent current and the reasons for its emergence in Tunisia. Living in London at the time, Rashid al-Ghannushi, leader of the Ennahda Movement, said that what emerged of Salafism was only “the tip of the iceberg.”    

Observers of this argument said that al-Ghannushi’s view carried messages to Ben Ali’s regime: the first warned of the expansion of the Jihadi Salafist base in Tunisia, while the second tried to convince the regime that “there was no escape from dealing with moderate Islam” to face extremism.

Generally speaking, Ennahda (which was part of the opposition abroad) stance on Jihadi Salafism was not far from this vision, which was essentially inspired by government and international attitudes that emerged after September 11th, which pushed towards more involvement with moderate political Islam.

After January 14, 2011 and the escape of Ben Ali, the political Tunisian landscape changed; the Ennahda Movement found itself a fundamental party in the new political equation, not as an opposition but as a main component of the coalition that ruled Tunisia in the first period, then as the ruling party after the October 2011 elections.

On the other hand, Salafism surfaced in the new landscape after those involved in the armed confrontations in 2006 were granted amnesty and the public appearance of some of their leaderships on more than one occasion.

It seemed evident for all observers that Ennahda’s method of handling the situation in Tunisia would not be the same as the Salafists’, since the former chose to enter the new political game from its widest gate, accepting in the process all the necessary alliances, compromises and agreements, and aiming to come to power through the elections.

The Salafists chose to exploit their public presence to gain field sites without getting involved in the political process. That was evident from their dominance over many mosques and fighting the niqab war in Tunisian universities, in addition to their social activities in many poor and underprivileged areas.

Despite superficial differences between the two routes, each party tried to use the other’s method to confirm a view promoted by Gulf Sheikhs and governments that the Arab Spring revolutions are Islamic and would rehabilitate Islam and its role in society.

This explains the absence of conflict between the Ennahda Movement and the Salafists. The former (a player in the political process) was keen to postpone this conflict for political considerations that led the new ruling party to expand the base of the sympathizers with the ‘Islamic Rule Project’ to face the secular one. That may entail turning a blind eye to some Salafists’ transgressions, including controlling mosques by force, attacking bars, forcing them to close, and stopping many cultural activities.

The maximum response by the Ennahda Movement and government officials was to declare that the only way to deal with the Salafists was through dialogue. Al-Ghannushi, in more than one occasion, stressed the need to call for a dialogue with them. But no results emerged from this dialogue, save the statements of some leaders of the so-called ‘Scientific Salafism’.

In light of increased violations by Salafists and an inactive executive authority, the civil society moved to attack both of them. The news reached the international media and the image of the Tunisian Revolution – once known as the revolution of jasmine, freedom and dignity – became associated with its violent Salafism. What primarily embarrassed the Ennahda Movement was the poor and fragile economic and social situation that required investment flows and new projects.    

The international pressure as well as the internal one – by civil and political societies – put on the Ennahda Movement, forced the government to threaten to confront the Salafists. The first insinuation from the Ennahda Movement was to declare that some Salafists were “created by the dissolved regime”, led by “its supporters” and serving “the counter-revolution agenda”. An arrest campaign was then launched against several Salafists in connection with acts of violence.

Though insignificant, this campaign has proved that the Ennahda Movement is a player in the political game which requires comprises to ensure a hold on power even at the expense of the closest current in terms of thoughts and ideology, while the Salafist current, which rejects getting involved in the political game, seems to have chosen to ‘escape forward’.

It is difficult to predict the conflict’s results and its extent, not because of the Salafist current, which demonstrated from the very beginning that it wouldn’t change its views but because of the Ennahda Movement, which hasn’t concealed that it is a pragmatic movement that deals with the situation according to the balance of power and what keeps it in power.